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LIMITING THE PROPERTY CLAUSE 
Jeffrey M. Schmitt 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Property Clause of the Con-
stitution grants Congress the power to regulate the public lands “without limita-
tion.” This Article argues that the Court’s interpretation of the Property Clause 
is inconsistent with constitutional history, antithetical to structure principles of 
federalism, and undesirable from the standpoint of environmental law. When the 
country originally debated the meaning of the Property Clause, the leading 
statesmen of the early Republic rejected a broad interpretation of federal power. 
They believed that, while Congress had a police power over the territories, it had 
no more regulatory authority over federal land within a state by virtue of the 
Property Clause than a private landowner. If the Court’s recent efforts to revive 
federalism are to be meaningful, it should return to this original understanding. 
Congress’s unlimited legislative power over federal lands enables it to overrule 
state policy on many of the core issues of state concern that justify the existence 
of federalism, including environmental law. Perhaps counterintuitively, reinvig-
orating federalism in this context would also structurally favor more robust envi-
ronmental regulation. This is because, while the federal government would retain 
the power to limit the use of its lands as a proprietor, the states would have the 
power to go further as sovereign regulators. However, because the state’s regula-
tory power would not include the power to override federal property rights, the 
states would not have the power to authorize any land use that would conflict 
with federal rules. Unlike the current system of federal supremacy, a limited 
reading of the Property Clause would thus structurally favor conservation over 
development. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In spite of the principle that Congress is limited to its enumerated powers, 
the federal government effectively has a police power over one-third of the 
country. This power arises from the Property Clause of the Constitution, which 
grants Congress the power to “make all needful Rules and Regulations respect-
ing the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States[.]”1 The Su-
preme Court has repeatedly held that Congress’s legislative authority under the 
Property Clause is “without limitations.”2 This expansive power extends to 640 
million acres of federal land, most of which is located in the West.3 Although 
the Property Clause is generally ignored in the study of constitutional law,4 it is 
 
1  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. This Clause is also known as the “Territories Clause.” Ngi-
raingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 203 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Enclave Clause 
further grants Congress a power of “exclusive [l]egislation” over federal land purchased with 
the consent of a state. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Although the Enclave Clause applies 
to most federal buildings, military bases, and some national parks, the vast majority of feder-
al land is governed exclusively by the Property Clause. See Charles F. Wilkinson, Cross-
Jurisdictional Conflicts: An Analysis of Legitimate State Interests on Federal and Indian 
Lands, 2 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 145, 148–49, 152 (1982). 
2  See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 535, 539 (1976). 
3  See CAROL H. VINCENT ET AL., FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 1, 4, 6, 
7, 21 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QGG-K74H]. The 
United States owns and manages roughly 640 million acres of land. Id. at 1. This represents 
approximately 61.3 percent of the land in Alaska and 46.4 percent of the land in eleven con-
tiguous western states. Id. at 7, 20, 21. In fact, 79.6 percent of the land in Nevada is owned 
by the United States. Id. at 7. 
4  No leading textbook devotes a single case to the study of the Property Clause. See general-
ly ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2017); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET. AL., 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 742, 967–68, 1039 (7th ed. 2013). 
Fall 2019] LIMITING THE PROPERTY CLAUSE 147 
thus a significant source of federal authority. In fact, the federal government 
uses its land ownership to justify overriding state policy on topics ranging from 
wildlife management5 to the oversight of care for unaccompanied migrant chil-
dren.6 
This Article will argue that the Court’s expansive interpretation of the 
Property Clause is inconsistent with constitutional history, antithetical to struc-
ture principles of federalism, and undesirable as a matter of policy. It therefore 
will present a new approach to the Property Clause that both accommodates the 
reality of widespread federal land ownership and imposes limits on federal reg-
ulatory power.7 Although legal history is at the core of this Article, its interpre-
 
5  See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 532–34. 
6  Federal authorities rejected state oversight of a facility in Homestead, Florida on the 
grounds that it is located on federal land. See John Burnett, Inside the Largest and Most Con-
troversial Shelter for Migrant Children in the U.S., NPR (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.npr. 
org/2019/02/13/694138106 [https://perma.cc/E4QC-EP66]. The federal government took the 
same position with respect to a shelter located on federal land in Tornillo, Texas before its 
recent closure. Pursuant to federal law, however, shelters for migrant children are typically 
subject to state standards and inspections. See Graham Kates, Some Detention Centers for 
Migrant Children not Subject to State Inspections, CBS NEWS (July 5, 2018), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/some-detention-centers-for-immigrant-children-wont-be-su 
bject-to-traditional-inspections [https://perma.cc/R2X7-T5CE]. These particular facilities are 
likely located on federal enclaves, but the Court’s modern Property Clause doctrine would 
enable the federal government to exclude state oversight of migrant shelters on any federally 
owned land. Id. 
7  Most recent scholarship on the Property Clause has focused on the power of the United 
States to own land within the states. See Gregory Ablavsky, The Rise of Federal Title, 106 
CALIF. 631, 684 (2018); Ian Bartrum, Searching for Cliven Bundy: The Constitution and 
Public Lands, 2 NEV. L.J.F. 67, 72 (2018); John D. Leshy, Are U.S. Public Lands Unconsti-
tutional?, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 553 (2018); Jeffery Schmitt, A Historical Reassessment of 
Congress’s “Power to Dispose of” the Public Lands, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 453, 455 
(2018). When scholars discuss Congress’s power to regulate activities on federal land, they 
nearly always support the Court’s broad interpretation. See, e.g., Peter A. Appel, The Power 
of Congress “Without Limitation”: The Property Clause and Federal Regulation of Private 
Property, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1, 15 (2001); Michael C. Blumm & Olivier Jamin, The Property 
Clause and its Discontents: Lessons from the Malheur Occupation, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 781, 
801 (2016); Eugene R. Gaetke, Refuting the “Classic” Property Clause Theory, 63 N.C. L. 
REV. 617, 620 (1985); Dale D. Goble, The Myth of the Classic Property Clause Doctrine, 63 
DENV. U. L. REV. 495, 498 (1986) hereinafter [Goble, The Myth of the Classic Property 
Clause Doctrine]; Dale D. Goble, The Property Clause: As if Biodiversity Mattered, 75 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1195, 1200–01 (2004) hereinafter [Goble, The Property Clause]; Nick Law-
ton, Utah’s Transfer of Public Lands Act: Demanding a Gift of Federal Lands, 16 VT. J. 
ENVTL. L. 1, 22 (2014); Martin Nie et al., Fish and Wildlife Management on Federal Lands: 
Debunking State Supremacy, 47 ENVTL L. 797, 819–20 (2017). Many other scholars discuss 
the Court’s interpretation with approval. Ablavsky, supra, at 692; Jessica Owley, Taking the 
Public Out of Public Lands: Shifts in Coal-Extraction Policies in the Trump Administration, 
13 FIU L. REV. 35, 38 (2018). The few scholars who argue for a more limited reading of 
Congress’s regulatory power under the Property Clause generally also contend that Congress 
was historically understood to have had a constitutional duty to divest itself of the federal 
land within the states. Albert W. Brodie, A Question of Enumerated Powers: Constitutional 
Issues Surrounding Federal Ownership of the Public Lands, 12 PAC. L.J. 693, 703 (1981); 
David E. Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283, 
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tation of the Property Clause is based on several modalities of constitutional 
argument, including text, original intent, history, precedent, structure, and poli-
cy, rather than any particular theory of constitutional interpretation.8 This ap-
proach represents a significant break from past scholarship, which has virtually 
ignored constitutional history outside the founding period and Supreme Court 
precedent.9 This Article is also the first to make the counter-intuitive claim that 
limiting federal power under the Property Clause would create a system that 
structurally favors conservation over the use and development of federal land. 
In sum, this Article will argue that, while Congress should have a police 
power over the federal territories, it should have no more regulatory authority 
over federal land within a state by virtue of the Property Clause than a private 
landowner. Under this approach, Congress could continue to limit activities on 
federal lands, just as any landowner can exclude trespassers. When acting sole-
ly under the Property Clause, however, Congress would not have the ability to 
preempt otherwise valid state regulations. Unless authorized pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause or another enumerated power, activities on federal land 
would therefore need to be consistent with both state and federal law. For ex-
ample, even if the federal government used its power as a landowner to author-
ize a company to pollute on federal land, the state would have the power to 
block such activities as a sovereign regulator.10 Unlike the Court’s modern doc-
trine, this approach to the Property Clause is faithful to constitutional history, is 
consistent with the Court’s federalism revolution, and would structurally favor 
environmental conservation. 
This interpretation of the Property Clause is based on constitutional histo-
ry. When the country first debated the meaning of the Property Clause, the 
leading statesmen of the early Republic rejected expansive federal regulatory 
power over the public lands within a state.11 After the first new states were ad-
mitted to the Union, westerners demanded that Congress cede title to all land 
within each state’s borders. Failing to do so, these westerners contended, vio-
lated the fundamental constitutional requirement of equal state sovereignty. 
Congressional leaders responded by arguing that the western states retained 
equal political power because federal land ownership did not confer any greater 
legislative authority on Congress than that of an ordinary proprietor. Continued 
federal land ownership was therefore predicated on a limited understanding of 
Congress’s regulatory power under the Property Clause. Although scholars 
 
294 (1976); Carolyn M. Landever, Whose Home on the Range? Equal Footing, the New 
Federalism and State Jurisdiction on Public Lands, 47 FLA. L. REV. 557, 559 (1995). 
8  For more on the standard forms of constitutional argument, see PHILIP BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991). The author’s goal is to present an argument 
that will be accepted by originalists and living constitutionalists alike. Id.  
9  See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Professor Ablavsky is a notable exception. How-
ever, his article primarily discusses the nature of federal title to the land rather than Con-
gress’s regulatory power under the Property Clause. See Ablavsky, supra note 7, at 635. 
10  Because the federal government would be acting only as a landowner, it would lack the 
power to preempt state law when acting solely under the Property Clause. 
11  See Schmitt, supra note 7 at 475–78. 
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have examined these congressional debates in other contexts,12 this Article is 
the first to use them to interpret Congress’s powers under the Property Clause. 
Placing the Supreme Court’s precedent within the context of these larger 
and more publicly visible congressional debates helps to resolve a longstanding 
scholarly dispute. The Court’s early cases did not directly rule on the scope of 
Congress’s regulatory power under the Property Clause, and scholars have 
parsed the Court’s dicta to reach dramatically different conclusions.13 Because 
congressional leaders publicly endorsed a limited view of the Property Clause, 
it is likely that the Court shared similar views. In fact, this Article will argue 
that the Court did not clearly endorse a broad view of federal power until the 
New Deal constitutional revolution of the early twentieth century. 
Structural principles of federalism also support this Article’s interpretation. 
The Property Clause is rarely invoked today because most federal legislation, 
including environmental law, is justified under a broad reading of the Com-
merce Clause.14 If the Commerce Clause conferred unlimited power on Con-
gress, the Court’s ahistorical reading of the Property Clause would be of no im-
portance. Over the past several decades, however, the Court has begun to limit 
congressional power to preserve a zone of autonomy for the states.15 
The Court’s expansive reading of the Property Clause, however, empowers 
Congress to sidestep these limitations on federal power and effectively overrule 
state policy on many of the core social issues that justify the existence of feder-
alism.16 By the same logic, if the Court were to reverse Roe v. Wade, and a state 
criminalized abortion, Congress arguably could authorize the construction of 
abortion clinics on federal land within each state. Congress also could legalize 
gambling, drug use, physician-assisted suicide, and prostitution on federal 
land.17 More realistically, the federal government could—and sometimes 
does—overrule state efforts to protect wildlife, the environment, and natural 
 
12  See, e.g., DANIEL FELLER, THE PUBLIC LANDS IN JACKSONIAN POLITICS xvi (1984); PAUL 
W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 9 (1968); JOHN R. VAN ATTA, 
SECURING THE WEST: POLITICS, PUBLIC LANDS, AND THE FATE OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 1785–
1850 6 (2014); RAYNOR G. WELLINGTON, Preface to THE POLITICAL AND SECTIONAL 
INFLUENCE OF THE PUBLIC LANDS 1828–1842 (1914). These historical works are broadly 
concerned with public land policy rather than the history of constitutional argument. 
13  Compare Appel, supra note 7, at 30–36, Gaetke, supra note 7, at 639–45, and Goble, The 
Myth of the Classic Property Clause Doctrine, supra note 7, at 502–11, with Brodie, supra 
note 7, at 712–15, and Engdahl, supra note 7, at 358–62. 
14  See Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
1, 66 (2003); Owley, supra note 7, at 37. 
15  See infra Section IV.A. 
16  See generally supra text accompanying notes 5 & 6. In 2017, California passed legislation 
directing the state attorney general to inspect detention facilities used to hold noncitizens for 
purposes of immigration enforcement. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
California denied the federal government’s motion to enjoin the law and held that the Cali-
fornia attorney general is entitled to access. See United States v. California, No. 2:18-cv-
490-JAM-KJN, 2018 WL 3361055, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 9, 2018). 
17  See Appel supra note 7, at 5 (raising similar hypotheticals and arguing that they should be 
constitutional under the Property Clause). 
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resources.18 Although Congress could directly achieve many of these same 
goals today under the Commerce Clause and its other enumerated powers, the 
Court’s broad reading of the Property Clause would undermine any future limi-
tations it places on federal power. 
In fact, limiting the Property Clause would have an immediate impact on 
issues that cannot be regulated under the Commerce Clause today. For exam-
ple, suppose that a wetland located on U.S. land was wholly located within one 
state and did not connect to any navigable water. Although the Clean Water Act 
(CWA) prohibits the discharge of pollution into the “waters of the United 
States,” the Commerce Clause does not justify application of the CWA to iso-
lated wetlands that lack a nexus to navigable waters.19 If the federal govern-
ment were to regulate the discharge of pollutants into this hypothetical wetland, 
it would therefore be forced to rely on the Property Clause. Under the Court’s 
current understanding of the Property Clause, federal authorization would 
preempt any conflicting state law.20 If this Article’s interpretation of the Prop-
erty Clause were adopted, however, the state could prohibit pollution of the 
wetland notwithstanding any contrary federal authorization. The inverse, 
though, would not hold. The federal government, like any other landowner, 
would be able to prevent the discharge of pollutants on its lands even if the dis-
charge would otherwise comply with state law. Like a one-way ratchet, limiting 
the Property Clause would therefore merely provide an additional layer of pro-
tection for the environment. Although this example may seem inconsequential, 
the importance of the Property Clause will grow if, and when, the Court nar-
rows the reach of the federal commerce power. 
This example also highlights why this Article’s interpretation of the Prop-
erty Clause would enhance structural protections for the environment.21 Under 
most environmental statutes, the states are permitted to go beyond federal pro-
tections.22 However, this is merely a matter of legislative grace. When such 
 
18  See LARRY VOYLES ET AL., ASS’N FISH AND WILDLIFE AGENCIES, WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT 
AUTHORITY: THE STATE AGENCIES’ PERSPECTIVE 2 (2014). 
19  See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 722, 739, 742 (2006). Although Rapanos 
technically dealt with the reach of the CWA, the Court’s interpretation of the statute was in-
fluenced by its understanding of the Commerce Clause. The “nexus” test is from Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Because no single opin-
ion obtained a majority of the Court, Justice Kennedy’s opinion, which is the narrowest, is 
most likely controlling. See Robert W. Adler, US Environmental Protection Agency’s New 
Waters of the United States Rule: Connecting Law and Science, 34 FRESHWATER SCI. 1595, 
1598 (2015). 
20  See California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 593 (1987). 
21  This Article is the first to examine the practical consequences of a limited reading of the 
Property Clause. However, there is a robust debate within the environmental law community 
regarding the proper role of the states. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environ-
mental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108, 110–12 (2005) (discussing the academic de-
bate). This debate, however, is generally about which level of government should have the 
primary regulatory role. Both sides acknowledge that the federal government has the consti-
tutional power to displace state policy. Id. This Article differs by arguing for constitutional 
limitations on federal power. 
22  See id. at 126–27. 
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laws are passed under the Commerce Clause, Congress always maintains the 
power to overrule state policy. If Congress acted exclusively under this Arti-
cle’s interpretation of the Property Clause, however, the states could regulate 
harmful activities on federal land in the same manner as activities on private 
land. Environmentally destructive land uses would thus be lawful only if au-
thorized both by the federal government as a landowner and by the states as 
sovereign regulators. In other words, rather than giving absolute power to the 
federal government, each level of government would have the power to stop 
activities on federal land that cause harm to the state’s environment. As recent 
moves by the Trump Administration have made clear,23 federal supremacy is 
not always synonymous with good policy or environmental protection. 
The remainder of this Article is divided into five parts. Part I will review 
the text of the Property Clause and intent of the framers. Part II will develop the 
original understanding of the Clause through an analysis of several previously 
overlooked congressional debates. Part III will examine Supreme Court prece-
dent and argue that it supported a limited understanding of federal power under 
the Property Clause until the New Deal Era. Part IV will argue that a limited 
interpretation of the Clause is more consistent with the Court’s federalism ju-
risprudence. Part V will contend that this Article’s approach would provide 
structural protections against undue environmental degradation. 
I. TEXT AND FRAMERS’ INTENT 
Constitutional interpretation typically includes an analysis of the text, orig-
inal intent, history, court precedent, and practical policy implications.24 The 
text and structure of the Constitution, however, do not resolve the issue of 
whether the Property Clause grants Congress an unlimited power to regulate 
federal land within the states. Moreover, because the federal government did 
not own a significant amount of land within the states at the time of the Found-
ing,25 there is little evidence of original intent. 
A. The Text and Structure of the Constitution 
The Property Clause of Article IV states: “[t]he Congress shall have Power 
to dispose of and make all needful [r]ules and [r]egulations respecting the 
[t]erritory or other [p]roperty belonging to the United States[.]”26 Samuel John-
 
23  The Trump Administration has recently proposed weakening regulations under both the 
Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act. See Coral Davenport, Trump Rule Would 
Limit E.P.A.’s Control Over Water Pollution, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.ny 
times.com/2018/12/06/climate/trump-water-pollution-wotus-replacement.html 
[https://perma.cc/L4KM-RDLN]; Michael Doyle, E&E News, Trump Overhaul of Endan-
gered Species Act Could Shrink Protections for Many Animals, SCI. MAG. (July 19, 2018), 
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/07/trump-administration-proposes-endangered-spec 
ies-act-overhaul-could-shrink-critical [https://perma.cc/998J-MCKJ]. 
24  See BOBBITT, supra note 8. 
25  See Schmitt, supra note 7, at 464. 
26  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
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son’s A Dictionary of the English Language, which is generally seen as the 
most authoritative founding era dictionary,27 defines “Territory” as “[l]and; 
country; dominion; district” and “Property” as a “[p]ossession held in one’s 
own right.”28 Giving the text its ordinary meaning, a reader in the late eight-
eenth century therefore would likely have understood that Congress had the 
power to regulate federal land. 
The key textual issue is whether the Supremacy Clause gives preemptive 
effect to such “[r]egulations.” The Supremacy Clause provides that the “Consti-
tution, and the [l]aws of the United States which shall be made in [p]ursuance 
thereof . . . shall be the supreme [l]aw of the [l]and . . . any [t]hing in the Con-
stitution or [l]aws of any [s]tate to the [c]ontrary notwithstanding.”29 A plain 
reading of the Property Clause in light of the Supremacy Clause supports the 
modern doctrine. If the Supremacy Clause applies to all federal land policy, it 
would be supreme over any conflicting state law. 
A more limited reading of the text, however, is also possible. The Enclave 
Clause grants Congress the power to “exercise exclusive [l]egislation” over the 
District of Columbia and “all [p]laces purchased by the [c]onsent of the 
[l]egislature of the [s]tate in which the [s]ame shall be, for the [e]rection of 
[f]orts, [m]agazines, [a]rsenals, dock-[y]ards, and other needful [b]uildings.”30 
Congress’s power of “exclusive legislation” over federal enclaves31 appears to 
be more robust than the Property Clause’s power to make “needful [r]ules and 
[r]egulations.”32 Anyone reading these provisions in context at the time of the 
founding (or today) would assume that Congress’s power to exercise “exclusive 
Legislation” over federal enclaves was more robust than its power to make 
“needful Rules and Regulations” under the Property Clause. As demonstrated 
below, however, Congress has always exercised an unlimited and exclusive po-
lice power over the territories prior to statehood. Any limitations on federal 
regulatory power under the Property Clause therefore must apply only to feder-
al land within an existing state. 
Although the Property Clause does not explicitly distinguish between fed-
eral land within a territory and a state,33 such a distinction is consistent with the 
 
27  See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era to 
Determine the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 358, 359 
(2014). 
28  SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE IN WHICH THE WORDS ARE 
DEDUCED FROM THEIR ORIGINALS, EXPLAINED IN THEIR DIFFERENT MEANINGS, AND 
AUTHORIZED BY THE NAMES OF THE WRITERS IN WHOLE WORKS THEY ARE FOUND (10th ed. 
1792). 
29  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
30  Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
31  Id. 
32  Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
33  In contrast, some scholars who advance a broad reading of the Property Clause contend 
that, because the Clause does not distinguish between “[p]roperty” within a state and 
“[t]erritory” outside of a state, Congress’s power over federal property must be the same in 
scope as its power over the territories. Appel, for example, does little to distinguish state-
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text. The Clause grants Congress the power to pass only such “[r]ules and 
[r]egulations” that are “needful.”34 The scope of the “[r]ules and [r]egulations” 
that are needful for a territory may be significantly more expansive than those 
that are needful for federal land within an existing state. The Northwest Ordi-
nance, for example, provided for the disposition of an estate at the death of the 
owner,35 but such a regulation would be unnecessary after statehood due to 
state intestate law. 
Modern doctrine on implied powers supports this more limited reading of 
the text. In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall explicitly equates 
Congress’s power to pass “needful” regulations for the territories with the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause.36 And, in NFIB v. Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts 
states that the Necessary and Proper Clause does not authorize regulations that 
“undermine the structure of government established by the Constitution.”37 In 
other words, he explained, laws that are “not consist[ent] with the letter and 
spirit of the constitution, . . . are not proper [means] for carrying into Execution 
Congress’s enumerated powers.”38 
Although Congress has not yet tried to push the boundaries of its regulato-
ry powers under the Property Clause, the Court’s unlimited interpretation of the 
Property Clause arguably authorizes legislation that would be inconsistent with 
the spirit and structure of the Constitution. As the Tenth Amendment makes 
clear, federal power is limited so as to preserve the sovereignty of the states.39 
The Enclave Clause protects state sovereignty by imposing a requirement that 
the states consent before Congress is empowered to displace state power over 
its territory.40 Allowing Congress to bypass this requirement by having preemp-
tive authority over all federal land without state consent thus arguably under-
mines structural protections for state sovereignty and federalism. 
Moreover, as a textual matter, because the Enclave Clause clearly authoriz-
es federal control over land within the states, it could be argued that its re-
quirements must be met before Congress’s “regulations” have preemptive ef-
fect over state law. Several canons of construction support this more limited 
reading of the Property Clause. Under the canon of generalia specialibus non 
 
ments, cases, and historical examples involving property within a state from territories. See 
Appel, supra note 7 at 65. 
34  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
35  See PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE 
63 (1987). 
36  M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 382 (1819). 
37  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 559 (2012) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
38  Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
39  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
40  The Enclave Clause is also limited to the seat of government and “needful Buildings.” 
Despite this textual limitation, however, the Supreme Court has held that national parks can 
be federal enclaves. See Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 152–53. 
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derogant, a specific provision prevails over a general provision.41 While the 
Property Clause generally applies to all federal property, including federal terri-
tory outside the states and chattels, the Enclave Clause applies more specifical-
ly to federal land within the existing states.42 It is also a familiar canon that the 
text should be interpreted to give effect to every word so as to avoid surplus-
age.43 Because a broad reading of the Property Clause grants Congress an un-
limited power to regulate federal land within the states, it renders the Enclave 
Clause meaningless.44 Reading the Property Clause in light of the Enclave 
Clause thus supports limiting Congress’s power to enact preemptive 
“[r]egulations” to territories outside existing states. 
In sum, the Property Clause, when read in context, could be read to grant 
Congress either: (1) an unlimited regulatory power over federal land, or (2) a 
more limited regulatory power that does not include the power to preempt con-
trary state legislation with respect to land within a state. Because the text is not 
dispositive, constitutional interpretation must turn to other sources, such as 
original intent, constitutional history, and court precedent. 
B. Original Intent 
Original intent also does little to clarify the meaning of the Property 
Clause. There is simply no record of the Founders discussing the power of 
Congress to regulate federal land within an existing state. In fact, the records of 
the Constitutional Convention contain little debate over any aspect of the Prop-
erty Clause. On August 18, 1787, a proposal was referred to the committee of 
detail to grant Congress the powers “[t]o dispose of the unappropriated lands of 
 
41  See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term Fore-
word: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 99 (1994) (collecting common canons of 
interpretation in an appendix). 
42  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
43  See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The Su-
preme Court’s Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2213, 2235 (1996). 
44  Goble rejects this argument by arguing that “[i]t is at least equally logical to read the arti-
cle I clause as completely displacing state law by its own force, while the article IV clause is 
preemptive only to the extent that state law is inconsistent with congressional legislation.” 
Goble, The Myth of the Classic Property Clause Doctrine, supra note 7, at 501. Although 
Goble’s reading is logically possible, it is not a natural reading of the text. The Property and 
Enclave Clauses use dramatically different language, and Goble’s interpretation would ren-
der the distinction almost meaningless. Under Goble’s reading, Congress could use its Prop-
erty Clause powers to immediately displace all state law, and it could use its Enclave powers 
to announce that state law will apply. Goble’s distinction also does not address the obvious 
federalism concerns animating the requirement that the states consent to federal enclaves. 
Finally, the Court has never accepted this distinction, as state law that existed at the time of 
the cession presumptively applies even in federal enclaves, other than D.C. See Engdahl, su-
pra note 7, at 333–35. The state may also qualify its consent to the enclave and retain juris-
diction over certain matters. See James L. Buchwalter, Construction and Application of Fed-
eral Enclave Clause (U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8 cl. 17), 21 A.L.R. FED. 3d Art. 6, § 2 (2017). 
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the United States.”45 Gouverneur Morris later proposed language that would 
become the modern Property Clause, which was adopted with no debate.46 
Perhaps the most that can be said of the Founders’ intent is that they 
thought the Property Clause authorized Congress to reenact the Northwest Or-
dinance and pass similar legislation. In Federalist 38, Madison pointed out that 
the Confederation Congress had created territorial governments and disposed of 
the federal lands “without the least colour [sic] of constitutional authority.”47 
Madison, however, did not mean this as a criticism of Congress, because it 
“could not have done otherwise.”48 Instead, the Confederation Congress’s lack 
of authority to pass the Northwest Ordinance was “an alarming proof of the 
danger resulting from a government, which does not possess regular powers 
commensurate to its objects[.]”49 In Federalist 7, Alexander Hamilton likewise 
stressed the danger posed by territorial disputes between the states without fed-
eral control over the public lands and pointed out that revenue from land sales 
could be used to retire the war debt.50 
The framers therefore sought to facilitate the continuation of the federal 
land policy that had existed under the Articles of Confederation. Three relevant 
principles governed this policy: (1) the federal government would have an un-
limited regulatory power over the federal territories (outside the borders of any 
state), (2) the new states would be equal in sovereignty to the old, and (3) the 
United States would retain land within the new western states. 
First, the federal government would have absolute regulatory power over 
the territories. Unorganized settlement of the western territories could provoke 
conflict with Native Americans, isolate western communities, and undermine 
the value of prime lands that could be sold to pay down the national debt.51 As 
Madison also noted in The Federalist, “[t]he Confederation Congress therefore 
passed several ordinances regulating the territories, even though it lacked any 
authority to do so in the Articles of Confederation.”52 The Northwest Ordi-
nance, for example, both provided a plan for government of the territories and 
directly legislated on matters such as contract rights, civil liberties, and slav-
ery.53 
 
45  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 321 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
46  Id. at 466. 
47  THE FEDERALIST NO. 38, at 193 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan 
eds., 2001). 
48  Id. 
49  Id. 
50  THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 26 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClel-
lan eds., 2001). 
51  See Andrew R.L. Cayton, Radicals in the “Western World”: The Federalist Conquest of 
Trans-Appalachian North America, in FEDERALISTS RECONSIDERED 77, 81–82 (Doron Ben-
Atar & Barbara B. Oberg eds., 1998); FELLER, supra note 12, at 6. 
52  THE FEDERALIST NO. 38, supra note 47. For a more complete discussion, see Schmitt, su-
pra note 7, at 467–69. 
53  ONUF, supra note 35, at 49, 62–64. 
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The second organizing principle of Confederation land policy was that any 
new states created from the territories would be equal to the original in terms of 
sovereignty. Through charters and land grants, the British Crown had granted 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Virginia, North and South Carolina, 
and Georgia territory extending to the Pacific Ocean.54 To encourage cessions 
from the states, Congress passed a resolution in 1780 providing that any territo-
ry ceded to the federal government would “be settled and formed into distinct 
republican states” that would “become members of the federal union” with “the 
same rights of sovereignty, freedom and independence, as the [original] 
states.”55 Soon afterwards, Virginia, which had the most significant western 
land claims, passed an act of cession in 1781.56 Like Congress’s 1780 resolu-
tion, Virginia’s act of cession provided that the new states formed from the ter-
ritory must have the same “rights of sovereignty, freedom and independence, as 
the other states.”57 By accepting Virginia’s cession in 1784, Congress again 
promised that the new states would be created on terms of equality.58 
Later legislation reaffirmed the Confederation Congress’s commitment to 
equal state sovereignty. The Ordinance of 1784, which was designed by Thom-
as Jefferson, established a system to organize the new territories and promised 
each new state an equal place in the Union.59 The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 
similarly pledged that all new states would be admitted “on an equal footing” 
with the existing states.60 In fact, the equality of the new states was inherent in 
the framers’ conceptualization of the territorial system. The Northwest Ordi-
nance was widely considered to be a charter for the territories analogous to the 
British charters for the original colonies.61 The leading scholar of the Ordi-
nance, Peter Onuf, explains, “[t]his usage permitted the identification of new 
states with old: the American colonies in the West would recapitulate the colo-
nial experience of the original states and then be recognized as their equals.”62 
A third principle that can be gleaned from the Confederation period is that 
the United States would retain title to federal land after statehood. The North-
west Ordinance states: “[t]he Legislatures of those districts, or new States, shall 
never interfere with the primary disposal of the Soil by the United States in 
Congress Assembled, nor with any regulations Congress may find necessary 
 
54  JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 82 (2d ed. 2009). 
53  See Arthur Bestor, Constitutionalism and the Settlement of the West: The Attainment of 
Consensus, 1754–1784, in THE AMERICAN TERRITORIAL SYSTEM 13, 21 (John Porter Bloom 
ed., 1973) (quoting 18 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789 915 (Wash. 
Gov’t Printing Office 1910)). 
56  Appel, supra note 7, at 21–22. By 1802, each of the landholding states had ceded its terri-
tory to the federal government. See RASBAND ET AL., supra note 54, at 84. 
57  The Virginia Cession, IND. HISTORICAL BOARD, https://www.in.gov/history/2898.htm [htt 
ps://perma.cc/5K5Q-6ADB] (last visited: Nov. 5, 2019). 
58  Id. 
59  ONUF, supra note 35, at xix. 
60  Id. at 50. 
61  Id. at xx, 72. 
62  Id. at xx, 49–50. 
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for securing the title in such soil to the bona fide purchasers.”63 The Ordinance 
therefore explicitly contemplated continued federal land ownership after state-
hood. More fundamentally, many agreed with the declaration of the Maryland 
legislature in 1776 that because the public lands were obtained with the “blood 
and treasure of the United States, such lands ought to be considered as a com-
mon stock.”64 Congress’s 1780 Resolution, moreover, guaranteed that any 
lands ceded to the United States would be “disposed of for the common benefit 
of the United States.”65 Giving the public lands away at statehood would have 
been inconsistent with this commitment to use the public lands for the common 
benefit.66 
Although the history of the Founding does not resolve the issue of Con-
gress’s regulatory power over federal land, the language of the Northwest Or-
dinance suggests that Congress would have a more limited role over federal 
land after statehood. The Ordinance prohibits the states from interfering with 
federal regulations “necessary[] for securing title.”67 The Ordinance does not 
appear to contemplate that any other type of federal regulation would exist, and 
it certainly does not preserve Congress’s power to preempt state legislation. 
And yet, the Ordinance makes federal title stronger than that of an ordinary 
landowner. Specifically, it provides that the states could not tax federal proper-
ty, regulate its disposition, or otherwise interfere with federal land ownership.68 
The Ordinance is thus consistent with this Article’s proposed interpretation of 
the Property Clause—namely that Congress would have the regulatory power 
of an ordinary proprietor, but federal title to the land would receive special pro-
tections from state interference. 
Moreover, the lack of meaningful debate over the Property Clause during 
ratification suggests that the anti-federalists did not see it as a source of danger 
to state sovereignty. According to Professor Peter Appel, a leading scholar on 
the Property Clause, “the antifederalists generally ignored the Property Clause 
and the power of the federal government over the West.”69 If the anti-
federalists had thought that the Property Clause gave Congress the ability to re-
tain an unlimited police power over potentially vast tracks of federally owned 
land within new states, however, the anti-federalists surely would have object-
ed.70 
 
63  Id. at 63. 
64  See BLAKE A. WATSON, BUYING AMERICA FROM THE INDIANS: JOHNSON V. MCINTOSH AND 
THE HISTORY OF NATIVE LAND RIGHTS 110–16 (2012) (emphasis omitted). 
65  See Bestor, supra note 55. 
66  See Schmitt, supra note 7, at 517–18. 
67  ONUF, supra note 35, at 47. 
68  Id. 
69  Appel, supra note 7, at 28. 
70  This argument is sometimes referred to as the curious incident of the dog that didn’t bark. 
Charles A. Sullivan, The Curious Incident of Gross and the Significance of Congress’s Fail-
ure to Bark, 90 TEX. L. REV. 157, 158 (2012) (quoting SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver 
Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 383, 397 (1953)). 
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: BEYOND THE FOUNDING AND COURT 
PRECEDENT 
Although Founding Era sources do not speak directly to the issue of Con-
gress’s regulatory authority over federal land within the states, the issue 
emerged repeatedly in Congress during the early nineteenth century. Because 
scholars have focused on the Founding and Supreme Court precedent, this his-
torical evidence has largely gone unnoticed within the scholarship on Con-
gress’s regulatory powers under the Property Clause.71 And yet, as prominent 
legal historian David Currie demonstrates, “it was in the legislative and execu-
tive branches, not in the courts, that the original understanding of the Constitu-
tion was forged.”72 This history reveals a widespread belief that Congress’s 
regulatory powers under the Property Clause were limited to those of an ordi-
nary proprietor after statehood. 
Constitutional history from beyond the founding period is an important fac-
tor in constitutional interpretation. In NLRB v. Noel Canning, for example, the 
Court explained that it “has treated [historical] practice as an important inter-
pretive factor even when the nature or longevity of that practice is subject to 
dispute, and even when that practice began after the founding era.”73 According 
to Justice Scalia, post-ratification history is “a critical tool of constitutional in-
terpretation” because it provides strong evidence of original public meaning.74 
Historical practices can also be important to originalist theories of construction 
when the original public meaning of the text does not provide a concrete an-
swer.75 Moreover, scholars who believe in a living constitution typically look to 
“ground[] constitutional interpretation in all of our constitutional history, rather 
than in the history of the Founding alone.”76 
 
71  See supra text accompanying note 7. Of course, historians have discussed these debates at 
length in other contexts. See, e.g., VAN ATTA, supra note 12, at 17–18. 
72  DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS 1801–1829 xi 
(2001). Currie’s exhaustive treatment of the Constitution in Congress includes a chapter on 
the public lands that covers many of the same issues discussed in this Article. See id. at 90–
91. 
73  Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525 (2014). 
74  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605 (2008) (relying on nineteenth-century 
history to determine the original public meaning of the Second Amendment). 
75  The Founders believed that, when the text was unclear, deliberate actions from Congress 
or the judiciary would “settle” or “liquidate” constitutional meaning and thus provide a 
“permanent exposition of the constitution.” See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive 
Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 527 (2003) (quoting James Madison). 
76  See Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 
1, 7 (1998); see also Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History—And Through it, 65 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1627, 1638 (1997) (“the history that matters is not confined to the Founding, or to spe-
cific Founding moments”); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 
U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 891 (1996) (“the Constitution should be followed [in part] because its 
provisions reflect judgments that have been accepted by many generations in a variety of 
circumstances”). 
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A. Tennessee 
Tennessee was the first state to emerge from the territories of the United 
States.77 Congress admitted Tennessee to the Union in 1796 with the under-
standing that the United States would retain title to all unappropriated federal 
lands.78 That same year, in a letter to Andrew Jackson, who was serving in 
Congress, Tennessee Governor John Sevier argued that the United States’ right 
to the vacant lands had ended with Tennessee’s statehood.79 He asserted that, if 
the United States were to retain title, “we should not equally stand possessed of 
those free and independent rights the original States enjoy.”80 When Jackson 
wrote back to Sevier, he agreed that continued federal landownership was in-
consistent with state equality because “the right to the Soil in my oppinion [sic] 
is so firmly invested in the sovereignty of the State.”81 
Congress appointed a committee to investigate Tennessee’s land claims.82 
Its report, which was written in 1800, is a remarkably clear exposition of the 
central thesis of this Article—although the United States retains title to the pub-
lic lands, its regulatory power is ceded to the states upon admission to the Un-
ion. The report distinguishes “the right of soil,” which is recognized as title to 
the land, and “jurisdiction,” which is the power to regulate.83 The report ex-
plains that, upon admission to the Union, “Tennessee acquired the jurisdiction 
over, but not the right of soil, within the said territory.”84 The report then states: 
And this is the more satisfactorily evinced to the committee, from the con-
sideration, that the Government of the United States held only a limited and 
temporary jurisdiction over the said territory, determinable on an event foreseen 
and specified; which the Government of the United States could not control; and 
upon which, the inhabitants and territory were to become an independent State 
or States of the Union. . . . 
There is, therefore, no ground for the claim of Tennessee to the soil, upon 
the principle that a grant of the jurisdiction over [the] territory possesses the 
right of soil therein; because, in fact, there is no grant of jurisdiction from the 
 
77  See Ablavsky, supra note 7, at 666. 
78  See id. Andrew Jackson, then a delegate to the Tennessee Constitutional Convention, and 
others argued that the new state should be given title to all land within its borders. Congress, 
however, rebuffed this argument, and it was dropped by the convention in its attempt to gain 
admission. Id. at 667. 
79  Letter from John Sevier to Andrew Jackson (Dec. 12, 1796), in 1 THE PAPERS OF ANDREW 
JACKSON 102 (Sam B. Smith & Harriet Chappell Owsley eds., 1980). 
80  Id. 
81  Letter from Andrew Jackson to John Sevier (Jan. 18, 1797), in 1 THE PAPERS OF ANDREW 
JACKSON 117 (Sam B. Smith & Harriet Chappell Owsley eds., 1980). Governor Sevier and 
the Tennessee legislature also used this constitutional argument to justify claims to Cherokee 
land that were guaranteed by federal law. Ablavsky, supra note 7, at 668. 
82  See Ablavsky, supra note 7, at 669. 
83  See id. at 641. 
84  1 1st CONG.–23rd CONG., AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATIVE AND 
EXECUTIVE, OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES IN RELATION TO THE PUBLIC LANDS 98 
(Walter Lowrie ed., 1834). 
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United States to the State of Tennessee.But the right of jurisdiction, and the right 
of soil, are distinct rights, and may be severed 
. . . . And it became a duty in the United States, by virtue of the same deed, 
to exercise jurisdiction over the territory until it grew into a State. The United 
States did exercise jurisdiction accordingly, until that event took place; upon 
which, that duty ceased, and the jurisdiction was of right necessarily in the 
State; but the right of soil remained in the United States. . . .85 
When the issue first arose in 1800, therefore, Congress articulated a limited 
interpretation of its regulatory power under the Property Clause.86 
B. The Enabling Acts and Missouri Crisis 
Although the issue then lay dormant for the next several decades, the ena-
bling acts of the new states were fully consistent with a limited view of federal 
power. Ohio’s Enabling Act of 1802 set a precedent that would be followed in 
all new states.87 As promised in the Northwest Ordinance, the Enabling Act 
specified that Ohio would be admitted “on an equal footing with the original 
States in all respects whatever.”88 It further provided that Ohio could not vio-
late the Northwest Ordinance, which prohibited the states from interfering with 
federal landownership after statehood.89 The Enabling Act also conditioned 
Ohio’s admission on agreeing to exempt not only federal land from taxation, 
but also any land sold by the federal government for a period of five years from 
the date of sale.90 This provision was included at the insistence of Treasury 
Secretary Albert Gallatin, who was concerned that state taxation could make 
federal land less marketable to out-of-state purchasers.91 The enabling acts of 
the new states thus explicitly protected federal title from any state interference; 
however, they did nothing to preserve federal regulatory power. 
The explosive congressional debates over Missouri’s admission to the Un-
ion are also revealing. In 1819, Representative James Tallmadge of New York 
proposed legislation that would have admitted Missouri only on the condition 
 
85  Id. (emphasis added). 
86  In 1806, Congress accommodated Tennessee’s demands for the public lands by ceding 
title to land in the east while retaining land in the western portion of the state. See Ablavsky, 
supra note 7, at 669–70. Congress then ceded most of this remaining federal land to the state 
in 1841. See id. at 670. 
87  See GERALD L. GUTEK, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN EDUCATION 173 (3d 
ed. 1970). 
88  See PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 285, 289 (1968). 
89  Id. at 288. 
90  Id. at 292. In exchange, Congress granted lands to Ohio and revenue from land sales for 
internal improvements. Id. 
91  See Letter from Albert Gallatin to William B. Giles (Feb. 13, 1802), in 1 THE WRITINGS 
OF ALBERT GALLATIN 76 (Henry Adams ed., Antiquarian Press 1960) (1879); JOHN LAURITZ 
LARSON, INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT: NATIONAL PUBLIC WORKS AND THE PROMISE OF POPULAR 
GOVERNMENT IN THE EARLY UNITED STATES 54 (2001). 
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that it ban slavery.92 In a series of debates that threatened to tear the Union 
apart, Northerners insisted that Congress had plenary power to impose condi-
tions on the admission of new states, while Southerners replied that no such 
conditions could undermine the equal sovereignty of the states.93 According to 
historian John Van Atta, prominent southerners like Henry Clay of Kentucky, 
the Speaker of the House, “believed that republicanism in America required 
that all members of the Union stand on an equal footing, no state intrinsically 
inferior to another. In that sense, Clay like other southerners regarded self-
government, not slavery, as the fundamental issue in the Missouri debate.”94 
With disunion looming as a realistic possibility, Congress eventually ad-
mitted Missouri as a state without any restrictions on its sovereignty.95 In ex-
change for what practically amounted to the admission of Missouri as a slave 
state, Congress also admitted Maine, which would become a free state.96 Con-
gress thus accepted the southern argument for equal sovereignty within the new 
states, though it banned slavery within the federal territories north of Missouri’s 
southern border.97 
After Congress passed the Compromise, Missouri proposed a constitution 
that made it illegal for the state legislature to free any slave and required the 
state to enact legislation to prevent free blacks from entering the state.98 The 
proposal arguably violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
as several northern states conferred citizenship on African Americans.99 James 
Madison wrote to President Monroe that “[t]here can be no doubt that the 
clause, if agst. [sic] the Constitution of the U.S. would be a nullity; it being im-
possible for Congress . . . to vary the political equality of the States” by admit-
ting a state on unequal terms.100 Congress ultimately admitted Missouri on 
“equal terms” with the original states but also explicitly prohibited the state 
from enacting legislation that would violate the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause.101 Although the Property Clause was not central to the Missouri Cri-
sis,102 it reveals both that the equal sovereignty principle was widely thought to 
 
92  Technically, it would have prohibited the entry of additional slaves and required the Mis-
souri legislature to pass an act for the gradual emancipation of all slaves within the state. See 
JOHN VAN ATTA, WOLF BY THE EARS: THE MISSOURI CRISIS, 1819–1821 1 (2015). 
93  Id. 
94  Id. at 96. 
95  Id. at 99. 
96  Id. 
97  Id. 
98  Id. at 116. 
99  Id. 
100  Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Nov. 19, 1820), (on file with FOUNDERS 
ONLINE, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN.), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Madison/04-02-02-0132 [https://perma.cc/ZQ64-8JY3]. 
101  VAN ATTA, supra note 92, at 120. 
102  Aside from antislavery extremists, there was a general consensus that Missouri, like all 
previous states, would be admitted on an equal footing. Id. at 88. The constitutional debate 
was about whether Congress’s power to admit new states included a power to impose condi-
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constrain congressional power and that Congress had complete regulatory au-
thority within the territories.103 
C. Western Demands for Cession 
Congress again explicitly debated its Property Clause powers in a series of 
high-profile debates over the public lands from 1828 to 1837.104 By the late 
1820s, federal authorities had put millions of acres of land within the new states 
up for sale.105 With a minimum price of $1.25 per acre, however, supply far ex-
ceeded demand.106 When Congress rebuffed efforts from congressmen like 
Missouri’s Thomas Hart Benton to gradually reduce the price of unsold land 
the longer it remained on the market (a policy known as “graduation”), frustrat-
ed and impatient westerners resurrected the constitutional argument for ceding 
the public lands to the states.107 
During 1828, the legislatures of Illinois, Indiana, and Louisiana petitioned 
Congress to cede the public lands within their borders to the state govern-
ments.108 The Indiana petition, for example, asserted that the state “has the ex-
clusive right to the soil and eminent domain of all the unappropriated lands 
within her acknowledged boundaries[.]”109 Like Tennessee’s earlier claims, 
western demands for the public lands were based on the doctrine of equal state 
sovereignty. Senator William Hendricks of Indiana, for example, argued that 
“the equality and sovereignty of the new States require that these States should 
have the control of the public lands within their limits. . . .”110 Senator John 
McKinley of Alabama, who would later serve as an associate justice on the Su-
preme Court, similarly contended “that the United States cannot hold land in 
any State of the Union, except for the purposes enumerated in the Constitution; 
and whatever right they had to the soil while the country remained under terri-
 
tions prior to admission. The Property Clause was mentioned only to contrast Congress’s 
power over territories with that over the states. See The Right of Congress to Restrict Slav-
ery, MO. INTELLIGENCER (Franklin, Missouri), Feb. 18, 1820 (arguing that the Property 
Clause could not justify the ban on slavery in Missouri because, after statehood, it “only 
gives Congress the same power over the property of the United States which every individu-
al has over his own.”); VAN ATTA, supra note 92, at 82–83 (summarizing the argument of 
Missourian Nathaniel Beverly Tucker). 
103  Van Atta summarizes the Compromise as follows: “[e]ach section received a vital con-
cession: the North, ample room . . . for free-labor expansion; the South and West, the right of 
new states to determine their own economic future with very limited congressional interfer-
ence.” VAN ATTA, supra note 92, at 4. 
104  See infra Section II.C.  
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107  See Schmitt, supra note 7, at 473–74. 
108  5 20TH CONG., AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES IN RELATION TO THE PUBLIC LANDS 622, 624, 630 (Asbury Dickins & John W. For-
ney eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1860). 
109  Id. at 630. 
110  4 REG. DEB. 152 (1828). 
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torial governments, passed to the States formed over the same territory on their 
admission into the Union, on an equal footing with the old States.”111 The states 
had a right to the lands upon admission, McKinley argued, because “sovereign-
ty is necessarily and inseparably connected with the territory and right of 
soil.”112 These prominent western politicians forcefully argued that the new 
states could not be equal in sovereignty as long as the United States retained 
title to the public lands.113 
A close examination of the western argument, however, reveals that its 
proponents did not understand Congress to have an unlimited regulatory power 
over federal land within the states. western leaders like McKinley and Hen-
dricks complained that federal ownership of the lands displaced state sover-
eignty. More specifically, McKinley complained that the new states were une-
qual because “they have been deprived of the right of disposing of, or in any 
manner interfering with the disposition of the public land, or any regulations 
that Congress may choose to make for securing to the purchasers any title it 
[may] choose to grant; [and] they have been deprived of the right of taxing the 
lands belonging to the United States[.]”114 McKinley thus complained only that 
federal title displaced state power to sell and tax the land. If he and other west-
erners had thought that Congress also had an unlimited regulatory power over 
federal land within the states, they almost certainly would have said so. Instead, 
McKinley complained only that Congress could regulate “for securing to the 
purchasers any title it [may] choose to grant.”115 
As I have detailed elsewhere, Congress overwhelmingly rejected the west-
ern argument for the public lands.116 The leading statesmen from each political 
party and section (including many westerners) argued that the new states had 
no right to own the public lands within their borders. Because the United States 
had owned land within the new states since the time of Tennessee’s admission 
to the Union in 1796, James Madison, the father of the Constitution, asserted 
that “the title in the people of the United States rests on a foundation too just 
and solid to be shaken by any technical or metaphysical arguments whatev-
er.”117 Many also opposed giving the public lands to the states because a central 
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authority was needed to control land sales for the good of the Union. Kentucky 
Senator Henry Clay, for example, argued that “[c]ollisions between the States 
would probably arise” from state ownership of the public lands, and a “spirit of 
hazardous speculation would be engendered.”118 Many further argued that giv-
ing the public lands away to the citizens of the western states would violate a 
constitutional duty to use the land for the common benefit of the Union.119 
Leading members of the nationalistic Whig Party also developed a com-
prehensive response to the western constitutional argument based on equal state 
sovereignty. Known as the National Republican Party or Adams Democrats 
during the 1820s, they favored a strong federal government that would use in-
ternal improvements, a national bank, protective tariffs, and land policy to spur 
development and national cohesion.120 In sum, the Whigs argued that federal 
landholding within the states did not violate equal state sovereignty because 
Congress had no more regulatory authority over such land than an ordinary 
proprietor. This evidence is powerful because, as more fully developed in the 
following section, the opposing Democratic Party was far more committed to 
state sovereignty and limited federal power.121 
Daniel Webster, the famous “expounder of the Constitution” and leader of 
the Whig Party in the North, was generally a strong champion of the Union and 
federal power.122 In response to demands for cession of the public lands, how-
ever, he rejected the ability of Congress to preempt state regulations on federal 
land. He explained that “the Senate had heard much relative to the thraldom 
[sic] under which the new States were; of their being subjected to another legis-
lation; of the condition of individuals who could not get a little act passed with-
out coming to Congress.”123 The “thralldom” he referenced was the supposed 
power of Congress to preempt state regulatory power. However, “[h]e wished 
to say that, so far as respects the equality of footing upon which the new States 
stood to the old, he saw no reason to impute inferiority.”124 This was because 
“[t]he [g]eneral Government exercised no legislation over the land lying in a 
State, except so far as that State had agreed to it. No power was now exercised 
by the Government over the new States which had not been exercised over the 
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old.”125 In other words, Webster argued that the new states were not held in an 
unequal state of “thralldom” because federal landownership did not confer up-
on Congress the power to displace a state’s legislation without its consent.126 
Senator David Barton of Missouri, the chairman of the Senate Committee 
on Public Lands, similarly argued that federal landholding was consistent with 
equal state sovereignty. While the argument for cession relied on the assump-
tion that soil and jurisdiction (i.e., landownership and regulatory power) were 
indivisible, Barton contended that “the answer to these new notions is, there is 
no such thing as absolute State sovereignty over all subjects.”127 Under the 
Constitution, Congress had the power to own and sell the public lands, whereas 
the state retained the power to otherwise regulate them.128 He explained: “[i]f 
infractions of State laws happen upon public lands within her limits, they are 
cognizable by State authority; and Missouri possesses all the kinds of power or 
sovereignty that New York does, although she has no grand canal upon which 
to exercise her powers.”129 According to Barton, federal landholding in Mis-
souri was constitutional only because Missouri retained regulatory authority 
over the land. 
Senator Henry Clay of Kentucky likewise asserted that, after statehood, 
Congress’s powers over federal land were “[n]othing more nor less than that of 
a proprietor, which drew after it no legislative powers whatever.”130 He thus 
argued that, “when these States were erected, they had otherwise the same 
power over it as the old States. The legislative power of Congress over the ter-
ritory ceased to exist.”131 Like Webster, Clay was an influential leader of the 
Whig Party who pushed for a strong national government that could build in-
ternal improvements like roads and canals.132 His limited interpretation of Con-
gress’s Property Clause power is thus significant, as a broader interpretation 
could have helped to remove the constitutional doubts that plagued federal im-
provement projects.133 
James Noble, Indiana’s first U.S. senator, favored cession as a matter of 
policy but rejected the argument that it was constitutionally mandated. Noble 
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argued that “the soil and taxation are separable from the sovereignty” of a 
state.134 He explained that “[t]he right of domain or estate may be owned by 
others, within the limits of a State—possessing sovereignty, where that sover-
eignty cannot tax the soil.”135 Noble thus argued that federal title, which dif-
fered from private title because the land could not be taxed or seized by emi-
nent domain, was fully consistent with state sovereignty over the land. If “the 
rights of soil and taxation are inseparable from the sovereignty of every inde-
pendent State,” he argued, then Virginia’s act of cession, the Northwest Ordi-
nance, and the U.S. Constitution “are frauds” because each preserved federal 
title and was committed to equal state sovereignty.136 Noble further asserted 
that “[t]he moment Indiana, or any other new State, was admitted into this Un-
ion, the State possessed sovereignty[,] . . . [and its] sovereignty was complete, 
upon the admission of the State into this Union.”137 
While Webster, Barton, Clay, and Noble all explicitly said that Congress’s 
Property Clause power was limited, many others agreed with the division be-
tween soil and jurisdiction that was central to their argument. A special House 
committee on public land policy in 1829, for example, repeatedly noted that the 
original states ceded “sovereignty and soil” or “jurisdiction and soil” to the 
United States over the territories.138 When discussing federal land in 1829, 
however, the committee’s report stated only that an “indisputable right of soil 
yet remains in the United States.”139 Such statements imply that, although Con-
gress had the power to regulate and own land during the territorial stage, the 
states inherited regulatory power at statehood. 
Others refuted the constitutional argument for cession by stressing that the 
new states had all agreed by statute to give up any right to ownership of the 
public lands within their borders.140 This argument assumes that, without such a 
voluntary agreement, the states would have inherited title and jurisdiction over 
the lands. As noted above, however, these acts preserved only federal title and 
said nothing about federal regulatory authority. Sovereignty—the political 
power to regulate—therefore was not voluntarily surrendered by the states. 
It is worth stressing that, in these debates over cession of the public lands, 
both sides agreed that Congress could not use its powers to violate the principle 
of equal state sovereignty. When westerners argued that continued federal 
landownership within the new states violated the principle, Congress did not 
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reject equal sovereignty as a limit on its powers.141 Instead, congressional lead-
ers constructed a constitutional argument to explain why federal ownership was 
fully consistent with equal state sovereignty. In sum, Congress defeated the 
constitutional argument for cession by disclaiming any sovereignty over federal 
land within the states. 
D. Native American Sovereignty  
At roughly the same time that westerners were demanding cession of the 
federal lands within their borders, Georgia and other southern states asserted 
authority over the Cherokee and other Native American tribes within their bor-
ders.142 Although the Property Clause was rarely invoked, many of the same 
constitutional arguments about the scope and nature of state sovereignty were 
raised in the ensuing debates.143 The constitutional crisis over tribal sovereignty 
thus confirms that the Jacksonian coalition shared the Whigs’ limited view of 
federal power under the Property Clause. 
Tribal sovereignty is a complicated issue, and the formal law was relatively 
undeveloped in the 1820s.144 In practice, however, the United States had long 
entered into treaties with the tribes and had largely refrained from interfering 
with their internal governance.145 The Treaty of Holston, signed by President 
Washington in 1791, pledged that the United States would protect the Cherokee 
Nation, guaranteed Cherokee lands within specified borders, and gave the Unit-
ed States “the sole and exclusive right of regulating their trade.”146 In 1802, 
Georgia ceded its western land claims (present day Alabama and Mississippi) 
to the United States in exchange for a promise that the federal government 
would “peaceably” extinguish Indian title to lands within the state “on reasona-
ble terms.”147 By the 1820s, however, many tribes decided to retain their lands 
no matter the price offered.148 In fact, the Cherokee declared themselves to be 
 
141  In fact, congressmen used the principle of equal sovereignty in other debates as well. See 
Mr. Reed of Mississippi, Judiciary Bill. In Senate—April 1826, in 1 NATCHEZ NEWSPAPER 
AND PUB. ADVERTISER, June 13, 1826, at 1–2. 
142  William G. McLoughlin, Georgia’s Role in Instigating Compulsory Indian Removal, 70 
GA. HIST. Q. 605, 629 (1986). 
143  Id. at 606. 
144  In Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 146 (1810), Justice Johnson stated in a dissenting opin-
ion that the tribes of western Georgia “retain a limited sovereignty, and the absolute proprie-
torship of their soil.” In Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 592 (1823), however, 
the Court ambiguously held that the United States had title to the land through the doctrine 
of discovery but that Native Americans had a lawful right of occupancy. For more on 
M’Intosh, see WATSON, supra note 64, at 318–28. 
145  See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE RISE AND 
FALL OF GENERATIONAL REGIMES 23 (2007). 
146  Treaty of Holston art. VI, Apr. 26, 1802, Return to Revolution & Early Republic 1778-
1800: Individual Items, GEORGIAINFO, https://georgiainfo.galileo.usg.edu/topics/history/art 
icle/revolution-early-republic-1776-1800/treaty-of-holston [https://perma.cc/Q4CB-EDDZ] 
 (last visited Sept. 25, 2019). 
147  1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 84, at 114 (Georgia Cession, Apr. 26, 1802). 
148  See WATSON, supra note 64, at 319–20. 
168 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:1  
an independent nation with an absolute right to soil and jurisdiction, effectively 
declaring that they would never dispose of their lands.149 
Georgia responded by asserting jurisdiction over Cherokee lands and an-
nouncing that state law would be enforced against all members of the tribe 
within Georgia’s borders.150 The Jackson Administration supported Georgia’s 
claim and urged the Cherokee to move to the western territories. In a letter to 
the Cherokee delegation, Secretary of War John Eaton warned that the federal 
government could not support the Cherokee in any conflict over Georgia’s as-
sertion of jurisdiction because the “right . . . of denying the exercise of sover-
eignty to that state within her own limits, cannot be admitted;—It is not within 
the range of powers granted by the state to the general government.”151 He fur-
ther said that “to continue where you are, within the territorial limits of an in-
dependent state can promise you nothing but interruption and disquietude.”152 
President Jackson similarly supported Georgia in his first annual message. 
Jackson noted that Georgia was a “sovereign state” and that “Alabama was ad-
mitted into the Union on the same footing with the original States.”153 He thus 
argued that “[t]here is no constitutional, conventional, or legal provision which 
allows [Georgia and Alabama] less power over the Indians within their borders 
than is possessed by Maine or New York.”154 The federal government, he ar-
gued, therefore had no power to protect the Cherokee “if they remain within the 
limits of the States.”155 
Jackson’s supporters then introduced the Indian Removal Act, which set 
aside land in the western territories for eastern tribes and authorized the federal 
government to assist in the removal of any Indian who resisted the application 
of state law.156 Opposition to the bill was fierce. Senator Theodore Freling-
huysen, the leader of the opposition,157 argued that Congress had “the entire ju-
risdiction and control” over relations with Indians.158 Congress’s exclusive 
power, he argued, derived from the Indian Commerce Clause and the power to 
enter into treaties, which became the supreme law of the land.159 Under the 
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Treaty of Holston, Frelinghuysen argued, the federal government had a duty to 
announce it would resist “all interference and encroachment” from Georgia.160 
Even if no treaty had existed, Frelinghuysen argued, “[t]he laws of the 
State can have no effect upon a tribe of Indians or their lands within a State, so 
long as that tribe is independent and not a member of the State.”161 This was so, 
he contended, because the tribes “hold by better title than either Georgia or the 
Union. They have nothing to do with State sovereignty, or United States, sov-
ereignty. They are above and beyond both.”162 The Cherokee were “as perfectly 
independent of them [the states] as they are of Mexico.”163 Georgia’s sover-
eignty, Frelinghuysen thus argued, simply did not extend into Cherokee territo-
ry.164 
Senator Peleg Sprague of Maine further argued that historical practice sup-
ported Cherokee sovereignty. “From the organization of the Government down 
to this very session of Congress,” he asserted, there had been an “unbroken and 
invariable” practice of entering into treaties with Native Tribes as sovereign po-
litical actors.165 This history was important, he explained, because 
“[c]ontemporary exposition has always been deemed of great force in settling 
even the most difficult questions of constitutional law. Practice and precedent, 
too, have often been considered as decisive authority.”166 Sprague thus asserted 
that “[i]f authority and practice can settle any question, this is at an end.”167 Be-
cause federal treaties were the “supreme law of the land,” he concluded, Geor-
gia’s attempt to annul Cherokee sovereignty was invalid.168 
John Forsyth of Georgia, among others, rose to defend the Removal Act on 
the Senate floor. He argued that the Cherokee were not an independent sover-
eign because, under his reading of the Treaty of Holston, the United States ob-
tained sovereignty over the Cherokee people.169 In the 1802 compact with 
Georgia, he further asserted, the United States agreed to “cede to the State of 
Georgia, whatever claim, right, or title, they may have to the jurisdiction and 
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soil” of the land within its borders.170 In sum, “[t]he United States obtained, by 
treaty, the power to legislate over the Cherokees, and transferred it to Geor-
gia.”171 He further argued that, because the United States had violated its 
agreement with Georgia by failing to extinguish Cherokee title, Georgia was 
justified in taking matters into its own hands.172 Forsyth thus argued that Geor-
gia’s actions were valid under federal law. 
Like the Jackson Administration, Forsyth and other congressmen further 
argued that the federal government lacked the power to grant the Cherokee 
sovereignty over land within a state.173 The Constitution, he asserted, “gives to 
the [g]eneral [g]overnment no power . . . to limit the jurisdiction or narrow the 
sovereignty of one of the States.”174 Even before the Founding, he argued, 
“[t]he States claimed as common property our Western lands, as obtained by 
the expenditure of common blood and common treasure.”175 The states 
“claimed the soil of the wild land for the Confederation; leaving the jurisdiction 
to the State where the land lay.”176 Channeling the equal sovereignty argument, 
Forsyth pointed out that Georgia had “followed the example of ten States, in 
the exercise of jurisdiction over the Indians within their territory. All the New 
England States, New York, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Mar-
yland, escape censure for similar acts.”177 
Congressman and future Supreme Court Justice James Wayne of Georgia 
similarly declared: “[w]e ask for no more than other States have and continue 
to exercise, without having their claims of jurisdiction over the Indians in their 
limits questioned. . . .”178 Wayne further contended that “[s]overeignty over soil 
is the attribute of States; and it can never be affirmed of tribes living in a sav-
age condition.”179 The Indians, Wayne claimed, “were proprietors of what they 
used, so long as it was used; but not sovereigns of any part.”180 Senator Robert 
Adams of Mississippi likewise argued that “everyone living within the bounda-
ries of a particular state is subject to the laws of that state. Otherwise chaos 
reigns.”181 
Supporters of the Indian Removal Act, however, acknowledged that Con-
gress could grant independence to the tribes in the federal territories. Forsyth, 
for example, said that “[t]he right of the United States to contract with, or legis-
late for, the Indians, beyond the States, is not denied; it is a necessary conse-
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quence of the controlling power of the Government over the territories of the 
Union.”182 Under their view, however, the United States had far less authority 
over land located within a state.183 With Jackson’s support, Congress passed the 
Indian Removal Act in 1830.184 
The issue finally reached the Supreme Court in Worcester v. Georgia in 
1832. The case arose when Georgia prosecuted a group of missionaries who 
lived with the Cherokee but refused to swear an oath to support Georgia’s 
laws.185 The Court held that the conviction was void because Georgia’s laws 
“interfere forcibly with the relations between the United States and the Chero-
kee nation, the regulation of which, according to the settled principles of our 
constitution, is committed exclusively to the government of the union.”186 The 
Court further held that “the Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, oc-
cupying its own territory, . . . in which the laws of Georgia can have no 
force.”187 The Court therefore adopted the same constitutional arguments raised 
by Senators Frelinghuysen and Sprague in opposition to the Indian Removal 
Act. 
Despite their victory in court, the Cherokee lost their land to the State of 
Georgia. Georgia did not enforce the Court’s decision in Worcester.188 The In-
dian Removal Act and adherence to Worcester then became important issues 
during the election of 1832.189 Jackson’s principal rival was Senator Henry 
Clay, who had earlier comprehensively defended U.S. landownership by dis-
claiming federal regulatory power.190 Clay criticized Jackson for undermining 
the power of the Court, violating treaties with Native Americans, and persecut-
ing missionaries.191 However, Jackson won the Electoral College by a com-
manding margin of 219 to 49.192 Jackson then persuaded the governor of Geor-
gia to pardon the missionaries to avoid further escalation.193 When conflict with 
Georgia and the U.S. government appeared possible, a faction of the Cherokee 
signed a treaty agreeing to removal.194 Although the Cherokee National Coun-
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cil refused to approve the treaty, the federal government forced the Cherokee 
people and other Native Americans to remove to the West.195 Tens of thou-
sands of Native Americans were forced from their homes, and thousands per-
ished as a result.196 
Not only did Worcester fail to protect the Cherokee, but it has never been 
fully accepted as precedent. As early as 1835, the Tennessee Supreme Court 
rejected Worcester and upheld the application of Tennessee law over Cherokee 
territory.197 The Tennessee Court held that Worcester was inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Johnson v. M’Intosh, which held that the 
United States possessed title to Indian lands through the doctrine of discovery 
and that Native tribes had only a right of occupancy.198 According to Professor 
Blake Watson, “Worcester was stillborn in the federal courts as well.”199 Van 
Buren’s appointees to the Court, including John McKinley of Alabama who 
had earlier argued for cession,200 ignored Worcester and relied on Johnson. 
Worcester has never been overruled, but to this day the courts rely on the rea-
soning of Johnson for issues of tribal land ownership and sovereignty.201 
Although the Property Clause was not explicitly discussed in the constitu-
tional crisis over tribal sovereignty, the debates reveal that the Democratic Par-
ty embraced the same constitutional principles that the Whigs had advanced at 
roughly the same time in the debates over cession. Jackson and his supporters 
in Congress argued that the United States lacked the power to displace a state’s 
sovereignty over the land within its borders.202 They further contended that, if 
the Cherokee were sovereign, Georgia would not be an equal member of the 
Union.203 As demonstrated above, these are the very same constitutional argu-
ments that Whigs like Clay and Webster raised when explaining why federal 
landownership did not displace state sovereignty. Because Jacksonians broadly 
argued that the states must have sovereignty over the land within their borders, 
it is reasonable to presume that they thought the same with respect to land 
owned by the United States. Indeed, the United States held title to far more land 
in the new states than any Native American tribe did, so the constitutional ar-
gument for state sovereignty would seem to carry even more force with respect 
to federal land. In sum, the Jacksonians’ constitutional arguments against tribal 
sovereignty implied that they had a limited view of Congress’s regulatory pow-
er under the Property Clause as well. 
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The Indian Removal Act further confirms that Jacksonians viewed federal 
power over land within the states very differently than such power over land 
within the territories. Secretary Eaton promised the Cherokee that “[b]eyond 
the Mississippi, your prospects will be different. There you will find no con-
flicting interests. The United States power, and sovereignty, uncontrolled by 
the high authority of state jurisdiction,” he asserted, would be able to guarantee 
Cherokee lands and independence.204 Jackson likewise said that the United 
States could guarantee protection and independence only “without the limits of 
any State or Territory now formed.”205 Although the Property Clause was not 
explicitly referenced, the contrast between federal power within the states and 
federal power over the territories is unmistakable. 
The constitutional arguments of the opposition to the Indian Removal Act 
were also consistent with a limited interpretation of federal power under the 
Property Clause. Notably, the opposition did not attack the principle of equal 
state sovereignty or the basic idea that the states presumptively had sovereignty 
over all land within their borders. This is important, because the federal gov-
ernment owned most of the land in new states like Alabama and Mississippi.206 
If that ownership conveyed unlimited sovereignty to the federal government, 
then one might expect the opposition to argue that displacing state sovereignty 
was common and unproblematic. Instead, the opposition focused on the unique 
circumstances of tribal sovereignty. In sum, the opposition in Congress and the 
Court in Worcester both argued that the tribes were distinct political communi-
ties outside the reach of state sovereignty, that the United States had the exclu-
sive constitutional authority to deal with the tribes, and that federal treaties rec-
ognizing tribunal sovereignty were the supreme law of the land. These 
arguments were fully consistent with state sovereignty over federally owned 
land. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the Jacksonians could have invoked an ex-
pansive interpretation of the Property Clause to support the Indian Removal 
Act. In Johnson v. M’Intosh, the Supreme Court held that, although Native 
Americans had a lawful right of occupancy, the United States held title to the 
land through the doctrine of discovery.207 If the Jacksonians believed that fed-
eral ownership of land within Georgia conferred expansive regulatory authority 
on Congress, the Property Clause almost surely would have been raised. 
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III. JUDICIAL PRECEDENT: THE PROPERTY CLAUSE IN THE SUPREME COURT 
A. Antebellum Cases 
Early cases on the meaning of Property Clause reflect that the Supreme 
Court shared Congress’s understanding. Although the Court held that Congress 
had unlimited power with respect to the territories, the cases reveal that the jus-
tices had a much more limited view of federal power over property within the 
states. Scholarly argument to the contrary is unpersuasive and has ignored the 
larger context of the debates over the public lands in Congress. 
In American Insurance v. 356 Bales of Cotton, the Court held that Con-
gress has complete regulatory authority over the federal territories.208 The case 
arose when the owners of a shipment of cotton challenged the power of a court 
created by the territorial legislature of Florida to render a decision in a salvage 
case.209 In an opinion written by Chief Justice Marshall, the Court held that the 
territorial court was valid because Congress had authorized the territory to cre-
ate such tribunals.210 In reaching this conclusion, Marshall held that Congress 
had “the combined powers of the general, and of a state government” over the 
territories.211 This power, Marshall explained, derived from a “general right of 
sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause which 
enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the terri-
tory belonging to the United States.”212 
Pollard v. Hagan, however, demonstrates that the Court had a more limited 
interpretation of congressional power over federal land within the states.213 Pol-
lard arose from a dispute over land in Alabama that was situated within the tid-
al zone of the Mobile River.214 The plaintiff in Pollard sought to eject the de-
fendant based on an 1836 grant of title from Congress.215 The issue in the case 
was thus whether Congress had the power to convey title to the land. The Court 
held that, although Congress had authority over the land while Alabama was a 
territory,216 Congress lost this power when Alabama became a state in 1819.217 
The Court reasoned that, at the time of the Revolution, the sovereign power of 
the states included “the absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the soils 
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under them for their own common use.”218 Because Alabama inherited such 
sovereign power when it became a state, Congress’s attempt to convey the land 
after Alabama’s statehood was void.219 
Although the technical holding of Pollard is limited to navigable waters, 
the Court went on to interpret Congress’s regulatory powers over federal land 
within a state. The Court stated that, after Alabama became a state: 
Nothing remained to the United States, according to the terms of the agreement, 
but the public lands. And, if an express stipulation had been inserted in the 
agreement, granting the municipal right of sovereignty and eminent domain to 
the United States, such stipulation would have been void and inoperative; be-
cause the United States have no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal ju-
risdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain, within the limits of a state or else-
where, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted.220 
The Court further explained that a federal “municipal right of sovereignty” 
was “expressly granted” in federal land only under the Enclave Clause.221 The 
Property Clause, the Court stated, did not confer such a power of regulation af-
ter statehood. It explained: 
We, therefore, think the United States hold the public lands within the new states 
by force of the deeds of cession, and the statutes connected with them, and not 
by any municipal sovereignty which it may be supposed they possess, or have 
reserved by compact with the new states, for that particular purpose. The provi-
sion of the Constitution above referred to shows that no such power can be ex-
ercised by the United States within a state. Such a power is not only repugnant 
to the Constitution, but it is inconsistent with the spirit and intention of the deeds 
of cession.222 
Scholars who support a broad interpretation of the Property Clause correct-
ly point out that the Court’s holding in Pollard was limited to the ownership of 
land under navigable waters.223 The legal distinction between holding and dicta 
is important to a court constrained by a higher authority or stare decisis. The 
distinction, however, is much less important to the constitutional historian. Re-
gardless of whether the Court’s language in Pollard would technically control 
future cases, it stands as highly persuasive evidence of how the Court in 1845 
understood the Constitution. 
United States v. Gratiot, which was decided five years prior to Pollard, is 
fully consistent with a limited reading of the Property Clause.224 Gratiot in-
volved a challenge to a federal act passed in 1807 that allowed the president to 
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lease lead mines in Indiana territory for a period of up to five years.225 Before 
Illinois became a state, lead mines were leased to the defendant under the au-
thority of the president.226 Not wishing to pay for the right to use the mines, the 
defendants argued that, because the Property Clause grants the power to “dis-
pose of” federal property, Congress had the “power only to sell, and not to 
lease such lands.”227 
In rejecting this argument, the Court did not hold that Congress has broad 
regulatory power over federal land within a state. Scholars who support a broad 
view of the Property Clause make much of the Court’s statement that Con-
gress’s power under the Property Clause is “without limitation; and has been 
considered the foundation upon which the territorial governments rest.”228 
Placed in context, however, the Court meant only that Congress’s power was 
“without limitation[s]” when the lease was originally formed at a time prior to 
Indiana’s statehood.229 The Court further explained that achieving statehood did 
not give Indiana any ground to “complain of any disposition or regulation of 
the lead mines previously made by Congress.”230 Read in context, Gratiot 
merely stands for the following unremarkable propositions: (1) Congress has 
“unlimited” powers to legislate over a territory prior to statehood, (2) Con-
gress’s power over federal property includes the power to lease and is not lim-
ited to a power to sell title in fee simple absolute, and (3) statehood does not 
nullify a congressionally authorized disposition of federal land. These proposi-
tions are entirely consistent with Pollard’s narrow reading of congressional 
regulatory power. 
In his highly influential Commentaries on the Constitution, Justice Story 
likewise interpreted Congress’s power over the territories more broadly than its 
power over federal land within a state.231 According to Story, “[i]t was doubt-
less with reference principally to this territory [the Northwest Territory], that 
the article of the constitution, now under consideration, was adopted.”232 Simi-
larly, Story asserted that the Property Clause “was obviously proper, in order to 
escape from the constitutional objection already stated to the power of congress 
over the territory ceded to the United States under the confederation.”233 While 
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Story stated that the Property Clause gave Congress power over the territories, 
he also asserted that Congress’s power was an incident of sovereignty. Citing to 
American Insurance, he explained: “[a]s the general government possesses the 
right to acquire territory, either by conquest, or by treaty, it would seem to fol-
low, as an inevitable consequence, that it possesses the power to govern, what it 
has so acquired.”234 
With respect to federal land within a state, however, Story asserted that 
Congress’s power was “not necessarily exclusive in all cases.”235 He explained: 
“[i]f the national government own[s] a fort, arsenal, hospital, or lighthouse es-
tablishment, not so ceded [under the Enclave Clause], the general jurisdiction 
of the state is not excluded in regard to the site; but, subject to the rightful exer-
cise of the powers of the national government, it remains in full force.”236 Tak-
en together, these two sentences imply that, while Congress could regulate fed-
eral property within a state pursuant to its enumerated powers (the “rightful 
exercise of powers of the national government”), the states otherwise retain 
“exclusive” jurisdiction.237 Story clearly believed that Congress’s power over 
federal property within a state would be narrower in scope than its power over 
the territories. 
The Court reaffirmed its narrow understanding of the Property Clause in 
the infamous Dred Scott decision.238 Chief Justice Roger B. Taney’s opinion 
for the Court notoriously held that African Americans could not be US citizens 
and that Congress lacked the power to ban slavery in the territories.239 While 
discussing Congress’s power to make “needful [r]ules and [r]egulations,” 
Taney wrote that “whatever construction may now be given to these words, 
every one, we think, must admit that they are not the words usually employed 
by statesmen in giving supreme power of legislation.”240 He continued: “[t]hey 
are certainly very unlike the words used in the power granted to legislate over 
territory which the new [US] Government might afterwards itself obtain by 
cession from a State” under the Enclave Clause.241 I zn fact, Taney declared, 
“[t]hey are not the words usually employed by statesmen, when they mean to 
give the powers of sovereignty.”242 Instead, Taney argued that “[t]he words 
‘rules and regulations’ are usually employed in the Constitution in speaking of 
some particular specified power which it means to confer on the Government, 
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and not, as we have seen, when granting general powers of legislation.”243 
Taney thus concluded that the Property Clause did not grant Congress a “des-
potic and unlimited power over persons and property.”244 Although Taney does 
not precisely define Congress’s authority, he clearly had a limited view of fed-
eral regulatory power under the Property Clause. 
Scholars of the Property Clause, however, have given little weight to Dred 
Scott for at least two reasons. First, because Dred Scott represents an aggres-
sively proslavery interpretation of the Constitution, scholars appear to assume 
that the opinion’s interpretation of the Property Clause must also be incor-
rect.245 Although Dred Scott deserves to be condemned for its support for slav-
ery, the Court’s narrow interpretation of the Property Clause was not responsi-
ble for its proslavery outcome. Importantly, Taney did not hold that Congress 
lacked regulatory authority over the territories; instead, he held that Congress’s 
power over the territories could be implied from its power to acquire them.246 
The federal ban on slavery was unconstitutional, Taney held, because it denied 
Southerners’ property rights in slaves without due process of law.247 The 
Court’s narrow reading of the Property Clause was thus not inherently proslav-
ery. 
Moreover, disregarding the decision because of its association with slavery 
would fail to seriously grapple with our country’s past. Although Dred Scott is 
morally indefensible, prominent revisionist historians argue that its interpreta-
tion of the Constitution was consistent with white public opinion and possibly 
even correct under prevailing legal doctrine.248 Legal scholarship therefore 
should not pretend that the Court’s support for slavery was an aberration; in-
stead, it must recognize that the Court’s proslavery viewpoint was part of the 
antebellum political and constitutional order. Simply assuming that everything 
in Dred Scott must be wrong would fail to take antebellum constitutional histo-
ry seriously. 
Second, scholars have probably ignored Dred Scott’s interpretation of the 
Property Clause because the opinion is more commonly associated with the 
more outlandish argument that the Clause does not apply to any newly acquired 
territory. Justice Taney asserted that the Property Clause “applied only to the 
property which the States held in common at that time [the Founding], and has 
no reference whatever to any territory or other property which the new sover-
eignty might afterwards itself acquire.”249 He reached this conclusion by focus-
ing on text and purpose. Because the text refers to “the territory” of the United 
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States, Taney argued that this proper noun must refer to specific land that was 
identifiable at the time of ratification.250 Moreover, Taney asserted that the pur-
pose of the Clause was to enable Congress to protect U.S. citizens in the territo-
ries so that the land ceded from the states could be sold to pay the national debt 
from the Revolutionary War.251 He thus concluded that the Property Clause re-
ferred only to the land considered by the framers at the time of ratification.252 
Like most modern scholars, this Article does not endorse Dred Scott’s narrow 
interpretation of the scope of the land governed by the Property Clause.253 The 
Court’s error as to the scope of the land covered by the Property Clause, how-
ever, simply has nothing to do with the Court’s interpretation of Congress’s 
regulatory power over the land that is governed by the Clause. Rejecting the 
Court’s interpretation of Congress’s power because of an unrelated legal error 
elsewhere in the opinion is unwarranted. 
B. Reconstruction to New Deal 
Several late nineteenth century cases recognize also that Congress had a 
general police power over the territories. In First National Bank v. Yankton 
County, for example, the Court broadly defined congressional power over the 
territories as a “full and complete legislative authority over the people of the 
Territories and all the departments of the territorial governments.”254 Following 
the reasoning of Dred Scott, however, the Court did not tie this power to the 
Property Clause.255 In fact, the Court in United States v. Kagama explicitly dis-
claimed the Property Clause as a source of power. It stated that, rather than de-
riving from “the clause in the Constitution in regard to disposing of and making 
rules and regulations concerning the Territory and other property of the United 
States,” the power to legislate for the territories arises “from the ownership of 
the country in which the Territories are, and the right of exclusive sovereignty 
which must exist in the National Government, and can be found nowhere 
else.”256 
 
250  Id. 
251  Id. at 435. 
252  Id. at 432. Taney, however, did not hold that Congress lacked regulatory authority over 
the territories. Instead, he held that Congress’s power over the territories could be implied 
from its power to acquire them. Id. at 448. 
253  Although a full discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, the Court’s application of 
text and framers’ intent is far too rigid. In sum, the framers must have anticipated that the 
United States could acquire additional territory, and they certainly knew how to write the 
Clause more clearly if they had intended to limit it to specific lands. The argument from in-
tent is also unconvincing because, even though the framers had specific lands in mind at the 
time of the Founding, the Constitution they created applies more broadly. 
254  First Nat’l Bank v. Yankton Cty., 101 U.S. 129, 133 (1879). 
255  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 440. 
256  United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 380 (1886) (citations omitted); see also Murphy 
v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885) (“The people of the United States, as sovereign owners of 
the National Territories, have supreme power over them and their inhabitants.”); First Nat’l 
Bank, 101 U.S. at 133 (referring to Congress’s power over the territories as “an incident of 
sovereignty”). 
180 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:1  
The Court more fully explained the basis of Congress’s “general and plena-
ry” power over the territories in Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints v. United States.257 While upholding Congress’s revoca-
tion of the charter of the Mormon Church, the Court explained that, “[h]aving 
rightfully acquired said territories, the United States government was the only 
one which could impose laws upon them, and its sovereignty over them was 
complete. No State of the Union had any such right of sovereignty over them; 
no other country or government had any such right.”258 Quoting Justice Mar-
shall in Insurance Company v. Canter, the Court continued to explain that “the 
power of governing a Territory belonging to the United States, which has not, 
by becoming a State, acquired the means of self-government, may result neces-
sarily from the facts, that it is not within the jurisdiction of any particular State, 
and is within the power and jurisdiction of the United States.”259 Congress’s 
authority, therefore, was “self-evident” from the lack of any other lawmaking 
body.260 Although the Court did not reach the issue of whether Congress re-
tained such a “general and plenary” authority over federal land within a state, 
its reasoning would have no application after statehood.261 
In fact, the Court’s late eighteenth century Property Clause decisions 
demonstrated that the Court continued to believe that Congress had less author-
ity over federal land within a state. In 1885, the Court in Fort Leavenworth 
Railroad Company v. Lowe held that the state of Kansas had the power to tax a 
railroad operating on the federal military installation of Fort Leavenworth.262 
The Court explained that, before Kansas was admitted to the Union, “the Unit-
ed States possessed the rights of a proprietor, and had political dominion and 
sovereignty” over the land.263 However, after “Kansas was admitted into the 
Union upon an equal footing with the original States,” the United States “re-
tained . . . only the rights of an ordinary proprietor. . . .”264 As a result, the 
Court held, “[t]he State could have exercised, with reference to it, the same au-
thority and jurisdiction which she could have exercised over similar property 
held by private parties.”265 
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The Court further held that, although the tax would have been invalid if 
Fort Leavenworth were a federal enclave, the requirements of the Enclave 
Clause had not been met.266 Pursuant to the Enclave Clause, Congress has “ex-
clusive” jurisdiction over land obtained with the consent of the state.267 The 
Court noted, however, that the federal government had long purchased land 
within the states without obtaining such state consent.268 The Court explained: 
The consent of the States to the purchase of lands within them for the special 
purposes named is, however, essential, under the Constitution, to the transfer to 
the general government, with the title, of political jurisdiction and dominion. 
Where lands are acquired without such consent, the possession of the United 
States, unless political jurisdiction be ceded to them in some other way, is simp-
ly that of an ordinary proprietor. The property in that case, unless used as a 
means to carry out the purposes of the government, is subject to the legislative 
authority and control of the States equally with the property of private individu-
als.269 
It is difficult to square this passage with unlimited regulatory power under the 
Property Clause. 
This is not to say, however, that the Fort Leavenworth Court held that the 
states have absolute power over federal land. Instead, the Court said that federal 
land, like all land, would be exempt from state legislation if “essential to the 
independence and sovereign authority of the United States within the sphere of 
their delegated powers.”270 State law, in other words, would still be preempted 
if it conflicted with Congress’s enumerated powers, such as its power over 
commerce and the post office.271 
As the Court in Fort Leavenworth noted, U.S. Attorney General George H. 
Williams reached a similar conclusion in an official opinion in 1872. Williams 
wrote that, “while the United States appear to now hold the land[][,] . . . it 
would seem that the jurisdiction over the same has passed to the State of Kan-
sas by virtue of the act of June 29, 1861, admitting that State into the Union.”272 
He further explained that “[t]he effect of that act was to withdraw from Federal 
jurisdiction all the territory within the boundaries of the new State, excepting 
only the territories of Indians. . . .”273 
In Ward v. Race Horse, the Court took Fort Leavenworth a step further and 
held that congressional regulations of activities on federal land were invalid if 
they conflicted with state legislation.274 Prior to the admission of Wyoming, the 
United States had entered into a treaty that guaranteed hunting rights to the 
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Bannock Indians on unoccupied federal lands within the state.275 Wyoming 
sought to regulate hunting on federal land and challenged the treaty by arguing 
that the equal footing doctrine made it the “preeminent sovereign” over federal 
land within its borders.276 The Court accepted Wyoming’s argument and stated 
the following: 
The power of all the States to regulate the killing of game within their borders 
will not be gainsaid, yet, if the treaty applies to the unoccupied land of the Unit-
ed States in the State of Wyoming, that State would be bereft of such power, 
since every isolated piece of land belonging to the United States as a private 
owner, so long as it continued to be unoccupied land, would be exempt in this 
regard from the authority of the State. Wyoming, then, will have been admitted 
into the Union, not as an equal member, but as one shorn of a legislative power 
vested in all the other States of the Union, a power resulting from the fact of 
statehood and incident to its plenary existence.277 
The Court therefore held that Congress implicitly repealed the treaty by 
admitting Wyoming as a state because “the [hunting] privilege conferred and 
the act of admission [of Wyoming as a state], are irreconcilable in the sense 
that the two[,] under no reasonable hypothesis[,] can be construed as coexist-
ing.”278 Because there would have been no conflict between the treaty and the 
admission of Wyoming if Congress had the power to preempt state hunting law 
on federal land under the Property Clause, the Court must have narrowly inter-
preted Congress’s property power. 
Scholars have rightly criticized Ward for failing to recognize that federal 
treaties and Indian law preempt any conflicting state law and should be liberal-
ly construed in favor of native tribes.279 In fact, Herrera v. Wyoming, which the 
Supreme Court decided just this term, explicitly rejects Race Horse’s argument 
that the federal treaty interfered with state sovereignty.280 And yet, scholars are 
wrong to therefore conclude that Ward has nothing to say about how the Court 
understood the Property Clause in 1896.281 The Court’s decision in Ward shows 
that the justices thought Congress had no power to preempt state law regarding 
hunting on federal land.282 The fact that the Court erred by holding that the 
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treaty had been implicitly repealed does not change the Court’s narrow reading 
of the Property Clause. 
Although the Court held that Congress’s regulatory authority was limited, 
the Court also held that the federal government was not an ordinary proprietor. 
In Gibson v. Chouteau, the Court held that a state could not authorize a private 
party to take equitable title to federal land based on possession.283 The Court 
stated:  
With respect to the public domain, the Constitution vests in Congress the power 
of disposition and of making all needful rules and regulations. That power is 
subject to no limitations. Congress has the absolute right to prescribe the times, 
the conditions, and the mode of transferring this property, or any part of it, and 
to designate the persons to whom the transfer shall be made.284  
As a result, the Court held, “[n]o State legislation can interfere with this 
right or embarrass its exercise . . . .”285 Taken in context, the Court’s statement 
that Congress’s power is “subject to no limitations” refers to Congress’s power 
to own and dispose of property. Gibson is therefore fully consistent with lim-
ited federal regulatory power. 
In 1897, however, the Court took an incremental step towards a broader 
view of federal power in Camfield v. United States.286 The defendant in Cam-
field was charged with violating a statute that made it illegal to enclose federal 
land.287 Due to a system of land grants that was common in the West, the de-
fendants owned all of the odd-numbered sections of land in the area in ques-
tion.288 By building a fence only on their privately-owned odd-numbered lots, 
the defendants managed to fence in the federally owned even-numbered lots as 
well.289 Because their fences were not physically located on federal land, the 
defendants argued that the federal act was unconstitutional as applied to 
them.290 
The Court upheld the application of the federal act. The Court explained 
that “the Government has, with respect to its own lands, the rights of an ordi-
nary proprietor to maintain its possession and to prosecute trespassers. It may 
deal with such lands precisely as a private individual may deal with his farming 
property. It may sell or withhold them from sale.”291 If the fences had been 
built on federal land, the Court therefore stated, the federal government could 
have abated the fences without recourse to state officers.292 The Court therefore 
took a broad view of Congress’s powers as a proprietor—not only could Con-
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gress prohibit trespassing on federal land, but it could directly punish trespass-
ers. Unlike an ordinary landowner, the United States was not required to seek 
state assistance to punish a private party that interfered with its property rights. 
The Camfield Court applied this broad view of Congress’s proprietor pow-
er to police conduct on private land that directly interfered with Congress’s 
property rights. The Court held: “we think the fence is clearly a nuisance, and 
that it is within the constitutional power of Congress to order its abatement, 
notwithstanding such action may involve an entry upon the lands of a private 
individual.”293 Confusingly, the Court characterized Congress’s power over 
federal lands within a state both as that of an “ordinary proprietor” and as 
“analogous to the police power of the several States.”294 The Court, however, 
clarified that  
the extent to which it may go in the exercise of such power is measured by the 
exigencies of the particular case. If it be found to be necessary for the protection 
of the public or of intending settlers, to forbid all enclosures of public lands, the 
Government may do so . . . .295  
The Court continued to explain that it did “not think the admission of a Territo-
ry as a State deprives it of the power of legislating for the protection of the pub-
lic lands, though it may thereby involve the exercise of what is ordinarily 
known as the police power, so long as such power is directed solely to its own 
protection.”296 At the turn of the twentieth century, therefore, the Court held 
that Congress had a power to regulate activities on private land within a state 
when the “exigencies of the particular case” made such regulation necessary 
“for the protection of the public . . . .”297 
Camfield thus held for the first time that Congress could regulate extraterri-
torially under the Property Clause.298 Congress, in other words, could use the 
Property Clause to regulate activities that did not take place on federal land. 
The Court’s explicit connection of this power to nuisance law, however, sug-
gests that Congress’s regulatory power was quite narrow. According to the First 
Restatement of Torts, a nuisance is a “non-trespassory invasion of another’s in-
terest in the private use and enjoyment of land.”299 An action in nuisance is thus 
 
293  Id. at 525. 
294  Id. 
295  Id. 
296  Id. at 525–26. 
297  Id. at 525; Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 100 (1928). In a brief two-page opinion in 
Hunt, the Court applied Camfield to a federal law that permitted the killing of deer on federal 
land in contravention of state hunting laws due to overgrazing, the federal law “was neces-
sary to protect the lands of the United States within the reserves from serious injury.” Id. 
298  Modern doctrine has not clearly articulated a principle for understanding Congress’s 
power to regulate state land under the Property Clause. For a scholarly debate over the reach 
of Congress’s extraterritorial powers, see Allison H. Eid, The Property Clause and New 
Federalism, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1241, 1249 (2004) (arguing for a narrow interpretation); 
Goble, The Myth of the Classic Property Clause Doctrine, supra note 7, at 509 (arguing for a 
broad interpretation). 
299  4 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 822 (AM. LAW. INST. 1939). 
Fall 2019] LIMITING THE PROPERTY CLAUSE 185 
not a state-law tort claim like negligence; instead, it is a remedy for an invasion 
of a property interest. The Court in Camfield merely held that, when a private 
party invades federal property interests, the federal government may directly 
abate the nuisance without appealing to the state courts for a remedy.300 This is 
hardly an expansive interpretation of congressional power, as private landown-
ers could also abate a nuisance by self-help under certain circumstances under 
the common law.301 Moreover, the Court’s holding in Camfield is consistent 
with the Court’s longstanding view that federal title is different than private ti-
tle. Just as the Court held in Gibson that the states cannot divest the U.S. of title 
through adverse possession, Camfield held that the federal government may 
legislate to protect the U.S.’s property rights from private invasions.302 
Later cases confirm that the Court’s opinion in Camfield did not signal a 
reversal in the Court’s limited reading of the Property Clause.303 In Butte City 
Water Company v. Baker, for example, the defendant challenged Congress’s 
delegation to the states of the power to enact regulations regarding mining 
rights on federal land.304 Although the law would seem to have violated the 
prevailing anti-delegation doctrine,305 the Court upheld the delegation because 
Congress’s power under the Property Clause was “not of a legislative character 
in the highest sense of the term . . . .”306 The Court reasoned that the Property 
Clause granted Congress only the “power to determine the conditions upon 
which the public lands shall be disposed of.”307 Because “an owner may dele-
gate to his principal agent the right to employ subordinates, giving to them a 
limited discretion, so it would seem that Congress might rightfully entrust to 
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the local legislature the determination of minor matters respecting the disposal 
of these lands.”308 In other words, Congress’s delegation was constitutional be-
cause it could only delegate a limited power to dispose of the federal land. Alt-
hough the Court began expanding federal power in Camfield, the Court in 
Baker stressed that federal power was still limited. 
In 1917, the Court in Utah Power & Light Company v. United States stated 
that although Congress had the legislative power to protect federal lands, as the 
Court had found in Camfield, and determine property rights therein, as the 
Court had stated in Gibson, the state otherwise had jurisdiction over federal 
lands, as the Court had held in Ward.309 The defendant in Utah Power argued 
that, because federal land within a state could be regulated by the state in the 
same manner as any privately held land, it was entitled to a right of way on un-
occupied federal land based on state law.310 In rejecting this contention, the 
Court explained: 
True, for many purposes a State has civil and criminal jurisdiction over lands 
within its limits belonging to the United States, but this jurisdiction does not ex-
tend to any matter that is not consistent with full power in the United States to 
protect its lands, to control their use and to prescribe in what manner others may 
acquire rights in them. Thus while the State may punish public offenses, such as 
murder or larceny, committed on such lands, and may tax private property, such 
as live stock, located thereon, it may not tax the lands themselves or invest oth-
ers with any right whatever in them. 311 
In other words, Congress could not be divested of its property rights by 
state law. As the Court explained in Light v. United States, “[t]he United States 
can prohibit absolutely or fix the terms on which its property may be used.”312 
When property rights were not at issue, however, state law would prevail.313 
C. The New Deal to Today 
In the New Deal Era, however, the Court abruptly changed course and ex-
pansively interpreted Congress’s power over federal land within a state. In 
1940, the Court in United States v. City and County of San Francisco broadly 
stated that “[t]he power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is with-
out limitations. And it is not for the courts to say how that trust shall be admin-
istered. That is for Congress to determine.”314 The Court therefore upheld con-
ditions imposed by Congress on a grant of federal land to San Francisco that 
prohibited the City from allowing a private company to use the land for the 
purpose of selling water or electricity.315 The Court explained that Congress’s 
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conditions did “not represent an exercise of a general control over public policy 
in a State but instead only an exercise of the complete power which Congress 
has over particular public property entrusted to it.”316 The Court thus broadly 
declared that Congress’s power over federal lands was “complete,” “without 
limitations,” and could be used to achieve Congress’s “views of public poli-
cy.”317 Soon after the New Deal Court began deferring to Congress in its 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court stated that “it is not for the courts to 
say how that trust [the power entrusted to Congress under the Property Clause] 
shall be administered.”318 
The Court cemented its expansive interpretation of congressional power in 
the seminal case of Kleppe v. New Mexico.319 This case involved a challenge to 
the constitutionality of the federal Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act, 
which protected wild horses and burros on federal land.320 A rancher com-
plained to state authorities that wild burros were eating his feed and harassing 
his livestock that were legally grazing on federal land.321 The state authorities 
rounded up the burros on federal land and sold them at public auction pursuant 
to the New Mexico Estray Law.322 After the sale, the federal Bureau of Land 
Management demanded that the state recover the animals.323 New Mexico then 
filed suit seeking a declaratory judgement that the Wild Free-roaming Horses 
and Burros Act was unconstitutional.324 
The Kleppe Court held that “the Property Clause . . . gives Congress the 
power to protect wildlife on the public lands, state law notwithstanding.”325 In 
doing so, the Court rejected the state’s argument that the Property Clause 
granted Congress only: “(1) the power to dispose of and make incidental rules 
regarding the use of federal property; and (2) the power to protect federal prop-
erty.”326 Instead, the Court held, “Congress exercises the powers both of a pro-
prietor and of a legislature over the public domain,” and its power over federal 
property is “without limitation[].”327 Congress had found that wild burros were 
“an integral part of the natural system of the public lands,” and the Court did 
not question this conclusion because “determinations under the Property Clause 
are entrusted primarily to the judgment of Congress.”328 Kleppe’s broad inter-
pretation of the Property Clause remains good law today. 
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In California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock, the Court held that 
while Congress’s power over federal land is unlimited, it is not exclusive.329 
The plaintiff in Granite Rock challenged a California law that required it to ob-
tain a permit before mining on federal land under the federal Mining Act.330 
The Court held that “ ‘the State is free to enforce its criminal and civil laws on 
federal land so long as those laws do not conflict with federal law.”331 The 
Court thus announced that Congress’s “plenary power” over the federal lands 
was not exclusive, but that any state regulation of activities on federal land 
would be subject to ordinary preemption analysis.332 
IV. STRUCTURE: THE PROPERTY CLAUSE AND FEDERALISM 
A. New Federalism 
Kleppe’s expansive interpretation of congressional power over the public 
domain is inconsistent with the Court’s modern federalism jurisprudence. Us-
ing “a form of structural inference,” the Court in these cases has developed 
“implied limitations in federal power that are traceable to some form of histori-
cally reconstructed original understanding of the appropriate federal-state bal-
ance.”333 In these cases, the Court has sought to limit the potentially unbounded 
power granted to Congress during the New Deal.334 
The Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence provides an apt analogy. In 
the decades leading up to the New Deal, the Court narrowly defined commerce 
and did not allow Congress to intrude on a zone of activities reserved to the 
states.335 In Hammer v. Dagenhart, for example, the Court struck down a regu-
lation of goods produced by child labor because, “[t]he power of the States to 
regulate their purely internal affairs by such laws as seem wise to the local au-
thority is inherent and has never been surrendered to the general govern-
ment.”336 After 1936, however, the Supreme Court changed course and upheld 
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the New Deal’s vast expansion of federal power.337 While upholding the Fair 
Labor Standards Act in United Stated v. Darby, for example, the Court stated 
that “[t]he power of Congress over interstate commerce ‘is complete in itself, 
may be exercised to its utmost extent,’ ” and “can neither be enlarged nor di-
minished by the exercise or non-exercise of state power.”338 In cases like Wick-
ard v. Filburn, the Court further held that the Commerce Clause empowered 
Congress to regulate purely local activities so long as such activities, in the ag-
gregate, have a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.339 Because 
virtually everything has an economic effect, the New Deal interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause effectively gave Congress an unlimited police power over 
the nation.340 The New Deal Court’s expansive view of federal commerce pow-
er mirrors Kleppe’s unlimited Property Clause. 
Starting with United States v. Lopez in 1995, however, the Court has im-
posed significant limitations on Congress’s commerce power.341 The Court in 
United States v. Lopez rejected the idea that Congress could regulate any activi-
ty that had an economic effect.342 Instead, the Court held that Congress could 
use the Commerce Clause to regulate only activities that were themselves eco-
nomic in nature.343 The Court then applied this doctrinal limitation to strike 
down the Gun-Free School Zones Act after finding that the mere possession of 
a handgun is a noneconomic activity.344 In United States v. Morrison, the Court 
similarly struck down the Violence Against Women Act after finding that gen-
der-motivated violence is not economic activity, notwithstanding the uncon-
tested fact that such violence substantially affects the interstate economy.345 
The Court further limited Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause in Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius by holding that Congress 
can only regulate preexisting commercial activity and cannot “create” com-
merce.346 
The Court explicitly tied these doctrinal limitations to federalism con-
cerns.347 The Court in Lopez, for example, warned that a broad interpretation of 
the commerce power would eliminate any “limitation on federal power, even in 
areas . . . where States historically have been sovereign.”348 And, in N.F.I.B., 
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the Court rejected a broad interpretation of Congress’s powers that “would car-
ry us from the notion of a government of limited powers.”349 As the Court stat-
ed in both cases, “we should ‘pause to consider the implications’ . . . when con-
fronted with such new conceptions of federal power.”350 Indeed, Justice 
Roberts stated in N.F.I.B. that even the Necessary and Proper Clause could not 
save those laws “that undermine the structure of government established by the 
Constitution.”351 
Like with the Commerce Clause, Congress could use a broad reading of its 
power under the Property Clause to eviscerate federalism. At its core, federal-
ism is a system of government that empowers the states to disagree with federal 
decisions on important matters of policy.352 Constitutional protections for fed-
eralism are thus meaningful only if they preserve some measure of state inde-
pendence on public policy. As illustrated in this Article’s introduction, howev-
er, the Court’s reading of the Property Clause would empower the federal 
government to effectively overrule state law on important policy matters that 
are traditionally left to the states. On many important issues that have become 
cultural flashpoints, such as abortion, immigrant detention, physician-assisted 
suicide, gambling, and drug use, a broad reading of the Property Clause would 
allow Congress to frustrate state policy. For example, Congress could authorize 
the construction of abortion clinics, casinos, marijuana dispensaries, or hospice 
centers that practice assisted suicide on federal land. Such a power would be 
especially significant given the fact that Congress can purchase or take addi-
tional land under its eminent domain power. The Court’s broad interpretation of 
the Property Clause therefore has the potential to undermine the Court’s feder-
alism revolution by empowering Congress to overrule important state policy. 
As the Court stated in Morrison, “[u]nder our written Constitution, . . . the limi-
tation of congressional authority is not solely a matter of legislative grace.”353 
The Court’s broad interpretation of the Property Clause is even more prob-
lematic when applied beyond the metes and bounds of federal land.354 The 
Court’s holding in Camfield—that Congress can abate a nuisance on privately 
owned land that interferes with the use and enjoyment of federal land—seems 
unobjectionable. A sufficiently broad interpretation of the Property Clause, 
however, would essentially create an unlimited federal police power. Because 
natural ecosystems are highly interconnected, virtually any land use or activity 
that causes pollution could substantially affect federal land.355 Moreover, most 
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economic conduct, such as factory production, the disposal of products or 
waste in landfills, or even the use of electricity, has some attenuated effect on 
federal land. A sufficiently broad interpretation of Congress’s power under the 
Property Clause thus “would erode those limits, permitting Congress to reach 
beyond the natural extent of its authority, ‘everywhere extending the sphere of 
its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.’ ”356 In sum, a 
broad reading of the Property Clause could erase Lopez, Morrison, and Sebelius 
by conferring on Congress the same type of unlimited federal police power that 
those cases rejected. 
B. Equal Sovereignty 
The Supreme Court’s Property Clause doctrine is also at odds with its re-
cent recognition of the equal sovereignty doctrine. In Shelby County v. Holder, 
the Court applied this doctrine to strike down a portion of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 (VRA).357 This legislation addresses the widespread problem of 
voter suppression. Although the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in 1870, ra-
cial discrimination virtually rendered the amendment a nullity for nearly a cen-
tury.358 In the rare instances where the courts struck down state policies, the 
states simply followed different discriminatory strategies “through unremitting 
and ingenious defiance of the Constitution.”359 This racial discrimination was 
especially pronounced in the deep South, where white voter registration rates 
were more than fifty percent higher than those of African Americans.360 
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to address these problems 
and fulfill the promise of the Fifteenth Amendment.361 Section 2 of the VRA 
prohibits any “prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure” that 
“results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States 
to vote on account of race or color.”362 Based on the history of southern defi-
ance, however, Congress understood that the South might annul the effect of 
Section 2 by constantly changing their discriminatory tactics. Section 5 of the 
VRA therefore requires a three-judge federal district court in Washington or the 
Attorney General of the United States to approve any change in the election 
laws of selected jurisdictions that had a history of blatant racial discrimina-
tion.363 
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Section 4(b) of the VRA selects jurisdictions for this preclearance sys-
tem.364 It originally applied to each state or subdivision that used any “test or 
device” to determine voting eligibility and had less than fifty percent of the eli-
gible population cast a ballot in 1964.365 Congress later updated the formula to 
include any jurisdiction that failed to meet this test in 1968 or 1972.366 When 
Congress reauthorized the VRA in 1982 and 2006, however, it did not update 
the coverage formula.367 Instead, the VRA allowed covered jurisdictions to 
“bail out” of coverage by showing a lack of recent discrimination.368 When 
Shelby County was decided by the Court in 2013, therefore, Alabama, Alaska, 
Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia 
were subject to preclearance based on data that had not been updated in dec-
ades.369 
The Court in Shelby County struck down the application of Section 4(b)’s 
preclearance formula. The Court held that the preclearance system violated the 
“ ‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty’ among the States.”370 Chief Jus-
tice Roberts explained that the VRA “sharply departs” from the principle of 
equal sovereignty because the “States must beseech the Federal Government 
for permission to implement laws that they would otherwise have the right to 
enact and execute on their own.”371 Because the VRA violates the doctrine of 
equal state sovereignty, the Court held, the VRA’s differential treatment “must 
be ‘sufficiently related to the problem’ ” of voting discrimination.372 The Court 
ultimately concluded that application of the preclearance formula was unconsti-
tutional because it could not even survive rational basis review.373 Because the 
formula relied solely on conditions from the 1960s and 70s, the Court held, the 
VRA’s limitation of the sovereignty of the covered states did not “make[] sense 
in light of current conditions.”374 
Scholars have almost universally criticized Shelby County’s equal sover-
eignty doctrine and especially its application to legislation passed under the 
Reconstruction Amendments.375 However, as documented here and more fully 
explored elsewhere,376 scholars are wrong to suggest that the equal sovereignty 
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doctrine lacks historical support.377 Scholarly claims that the Court in Shelby 
County “invented” equal sovereignty are tenable only by myopically focusing 
on Supreme Court precedent on the equal footing doctrine.378 And yet, it is fair 
to take the Court to task for applying the equal sovereignty doctrine to limit 
Congress’s power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments while giving 
Congress an unlimited legislative power over nearly one-third of the country, 
most of which is located within a small number of Western states. As demon-
strated above, equal sovereignty arguments originated in debates over the pub-
lic lands and were rebuffed by congressmen who disclaimed any federal regula-
tory power over U.S. lands within the states. It is therefore anomalous for the 
Court to recognize the equal sovereignty principle while maintaining that Con-
gress has unlimited regulatory power under the Property Clause. 
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
A. The Property Clause and Environmental Law 
This Article’s interpretation of the Property Clause is defensible from the 
standpoint of practical policy concerns. In sum, limiting the Property Clause 
would change the status quo only in the rare instances where the Commerce 
Clause does not justify a federal regulation. When the Property Clause is the 
sole basis of federal authority, this Article’s approach would require all land 
uses to be consistent with both federal and state policy. States like California 
would therefore have a newfound power to prevent environmental degradation 
 
377  Ablavsky is one of the few modern scholars to recognize the historical support for the 
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(2016). 
194 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:1  
on federal land within their borders.379 Because the states lack the power to 
seize federal land through eminent domain,380 however, state power would be 
asymmetrical. Although the states could veto environmentally harmful activi-
ties on federal land, they would otherwise be unable to override federal policy. 
Just like any other landowner, the federal government would still retain the 
power to exclude polluters or companies that seek to extract resources, even 
over state objections. This asymmetry may be desirable because, as the current 
crisis over climate change demonstrates, we often have incentives to overde-
velop at the expense of the long-term public good.381 
When the first major environmental statutes were passed during the 1970s, 
the Commerce Clause appeared to provide a solid foundation.382 Clean air, 
clean water, and even biodiversity all have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce, at least in the aggregate. Since the Court limited the reach of the 
Commerce Clause to economic activity in Lopez, however, there has been con-
siderable academic debate over whether these laws remain fully justified.383 
Environmental legislation is often not commercial in nature and sometimes 
regulates activities that appear to be no more economic than the conduct at is-
sue in Lopez or Morrison. 
This is especially true for the Clean Water Act (discussed in this Article’s 
introduction) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA).384 The purpose of the 
ESA is to protect endangered and threatened species and the ecosystems that 
they rely upon.385 The ESA achieves this goal by, among other things, protect-
ing the species and their habitats from federal action and prohibiting anyone 
from “taking” protected animals.386 The “taking” provision has been broadly 
interpreted to include not only directly harming a protected animal, but also 
modifying its habitat in a way that causes such harm.387 
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384  Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2012 & Supp. V 2017). 
385  Id. § 1531(b). 
386  Id. § 1538 (a)(1)(B)–(C). 
387  50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2018). 
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Although the lower courts continue to uphold the ESA,388 its constitution-
ality under the Commerce Clause is far from clear in every application. The 
habitats of roughly half of the endangered or threatened species covered under 
the act are located within a single state, and most of the animals have little or 
no commercial value.389 It would therefore be possible for a court to conclude 
that the protection of endangered species is no more economic than the gender-
motivated violence or gun possession that was struck down in Morrison and 
Lopez. In fact, several lower court judges who have directly confronted the is-
sue have suggested that some applications of the ESA would be unconstitution-
al.390 
In Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton, for example, a real estate developer’s 
plan for a massive housing development threatened the existence of the arroyo 
southwestern toad.391 The toad has no commercial value, the threatened habitat 
was located solely within California, and the toad rarely travels more than a 
mile from its habitat.392 The D.C. Court of Appeals upheld the application of 
the ESA to block the developer’s plan, but Chief Judge Ginsburg wrote sepa-
rately to stress her view that, “with respect to a species that is not an article in 
interstate commerce and does not affect interstate commerce, a take can be reg-
ulated if—but only if—the take itself substantially affects interstate com-
merce.”393 Ginsburg joined the court’s opinion only because the regulated ac-
tivity was “large-scale residential development.”394 However, she stated, “the 
lone hiker in the woods, or the homeowner who moves dirt in order to land-
scape his property, though he takes the toad, does not affect interstate com-
merce.”395 It is possible that the same could be said for other private takings by 
outdoor enthusiasts without a commercial motive, such as the recreational fish-
erman, hunter, or camper. 
Although there are thus plausible arguments against the constitutionality of 
some applications of the ESA, this Article takes no position on their validity. 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Gonzales v. Raich potentially supports the 
constitutionality of the ESA in whole.396 The Court in Raich upheld the appli-
cation of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) to the intrastate home-growth 
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and use of medical marijuana in California.397 The Court in Raich reasoned that 
enforcement against medical marijuana was constitutional because it was a 
necessary part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme (the CSA) that was justi-
fied under the Commerce Clause.398 Although a full discussion is beyond the 
scope of this Article, similar logic potentially could be used for the ESA.399 
Even if federal environmental legislation like the ESA is sound under the 
current doctrine, it is always possible that the Supreme Court will further nar-
row the Commerce Clause. In fact, with Justice Kennedy’s retirement and the 
appointment of Justice Kavanaugh, such a move would not be completely un-
expected. The federalism revolution of the last few decades has been a product 
of the right, and studies consistently show that Kavanaugh is to the right of 
Kennedy on most issues.400 In fact, prominent conservative academics have 
called for the new Court to further limit federal power, including in the sphere 
of the Commerce Clause and environmental law.401 
If the Supreme Court were to hold that the Commerce Clause cannot justify 
the application of a federal environmental law, the Property Clause is another 
potential source of authority. In fact, several scholars argue that the Property 
Clause currently removes any constitutional doubt regarding federal power 
over the environment.402 Some scholars even contend that the Property Clause 
justifies federal regulation of anything that, in the aggregate, could have an ef-
fect on federal land.403 
Under this Article’s interpretation of the Property Clause, even where the 
Commerce Clause does not apply, Congress would still have the power to enact 
environmental regulations protecting federal land. As the Court held in pre-
New Deal cases like Camfield, Congress can exclude people, corporations, and 
specific activities from its lands just like any other landowner.404 In fact, be-
cause the power to regulate is typically used to limit or prohibit, Congress’s 
power as a proprietor would not be dramatically different from a sovereign 
power to regulate. Just as a proprietor can deny permission to a company that 
seeks to conduct fracking or drill for oil on her privately owned land, Congress 
could use its proprietary powers to prohibit such activities on U.S. lands. 
The key distinction between regulatory and proprietary power is whether 
Congress has the ability to preempt state legislation. Pursuant to the Supremacy 
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Clause, federal regulations preempt any conflicting state legislation.405 An or-
dinary proprietor, however, lacks the power to overrule valid state law. Acting 
only as a proprietor of federal land, Congress would thus lack the power to au-
thorize the destruction of the habitat of a threatened species or the pollution of 
an intrastate wetland if prohibited by state law. Limiting the Property Clause 
would thus preserve federal authority while also empowering the states to pro-
vide a check on federal standards.406 
While this Article’s interpretation of the Property Clause would give the 
states the power to protect the environment from federally authorized activities, 
it would not allow states to undermine federal protections for U.S. land. This is 
true because of the nature of federal title. Unlike an ordinary landowner, Con-
gress has always had an unlimited power to retain and dispose of federal land 
without any interference from the states.407 Even under a limited interpretation 
of the Property Clause, the states thus could not take federal land, authorize 
private parties to interfere with federal land rights, or assess property taxes on 
the United States. Unlike with a private landowner, therefore, the states cannot 
overrule federal land use restrictions by interfering with federal property rights. 
For example, a state cannot use its eminent domain power to seize federal lands 
for development. As a result, limiting the Property Clause would not empower 
the states to roll back environmental protections for federal lands. 
Providing the states and federal government with overlapping power would 
therefore structurally favor conservation over development. Our federally dom-
inated system has worked reasonably well only because the federal government 
has aggressively sought to protect the environment since the 1970s.408 Even 
when the executive has been less inclined towards environmental protection, 
such as during the Trump administration,409 Congress has not dramatically 
changed the law. The Courts thus often block executive action that exceeds 
statutory authorization.410 But suppose that Congress scrapped environmental 
legislation and declared open season for pollution, development, and resource 
extraction. Under modern doctrine, the states would be powerless to stop the 
resulting environmental harm. Modern environmental federalism is thus not in-
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herently disposed to environmental protection; instead, it has served environ-
mental interests only because the federal government has been disposed to do 
so up to this point. 
Indeed, “environmental federalism” is a misnomer.411 Because the states 
have no more independence than the federal government allows, there is no ac-
tual split of sovereign authority.412 Although federal law usually permits the 
states to strengthen environmental protections,413 Congress always retains the 
power to overrule state law. Federal policy—good or bad—can therefore poten-
tially always control. By preserving state sovereignty, a limited reading of the 
Property Clause would empower states to veto destructive federal policy. 
B. Other Issues: Federal Land Ownership, Tribal Sovereignty, and Other 
Social Issues 
Several legal scholars contend that, under the original meaning of the 
Property Clause, Congress not only has a “power to dispose of” federal land, 
but it also has a duty to do so.414 Such scholarship provides the academic foun-
dation for legislation such as Utah’s Transfer of Public Lands Act, which de-
mands that the federal government transfer title to more than twenty-million 
acres of land to the state.415 Although such state legislation is preempted by 
federal law, the Republican platform and many national party leaders have en-
dorsed transferring at least some significant portion of federal land to the 
states.416 
This Article’s proposed limitation of the Property Clause, however, would 
have no effect on federal land ownership. As I have argued elsewhere at length, 
federal land ownership is fully consistent with constitutional history.417 When 
the meaning of the Property Clause was first debated in Congress, the leading 
statesmen of the day argued that unqualified federal land ownership was consti-
tutional because it did not carry a national police power into the territory of the 
states. Returning to the original understanding of the Property Clause thus 
would not support state demands for federal land. By the same logic, however, 
it also would not save California’s recent attempt to limit the federal govern-
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ment’s power to sell land to private parties.418 Congress’s power to retain or 
sell the federal lands would remain unlimited. 
This Article’s interpretation of the Property Clause would also have no ef-
fect on federal Indian law. The Court has long held that the tribes are “ ‘domes-
tic dependent nations,’ subject to plenary control by Congress.”419 In U.S. v. 
Lara, the Court stated that Congress’s “broad general powers to legislate in re-
spect to Indian tribes” derive from a combination of the Indian Commerce 
Clause, the treaty power, and inherent military and foreign affairs powers that 
are “necessary concomitants of nationality.”420 Notwithstanding the obvious 
connections,421 the Property Clause is thus not a basis of federal power over the 
Indian tribes. A limited reading of the Property Clause would therefore not em-
power the states to interfere with federal Indian law. 
This Article’s interpretation, however, would prevent Congress from abus-
ing its Property Clause power by overruling the states on a range of other social 
issues. As discussed in the Introduction, the Court’s current interpretation of 
the Property Clause empowers Congress to unilaterally seize land within a state 
and place it beyond the state’s control. Although the Property Clause is often 
associated with environmental law, there is nothing in the doctrine to stop Con-
gress from using the Clause to create havens where people are exempt from 
state law. Congress therefore could effectively overrule state policies on issues 
such as the treatment of detained migrant children, abortion, gambling, or phy-
sician-assisted suicide. Under the original understanding of the Constitution, 
Congress must obtain the consent of the states under the Enclave Clause before 
obtaining such power. This Article’s interpretation of the Property Clause 
would thus preserve state sovereignty over internal affairs. 
State sovereignty, of course, is not an unmitigated good. Most Americans 
(including the author) believe that empowering the states to outlaw abortion 
would constitute bad policy.422 States’ rights ideology also was used to justify 
the evils of slavery, secession, and Jim Crow.423 And yet, federalism has also 
been used to justify antislavery opposition to the Fugitive Slave Act and state 
sanctuary policies that seek to ameliorate some of the harsh consequences of 
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federal immigration enforcement.424 In sum, federalism is a system of govern-
ment that empowers a local majority to pass laws that are at odds with federal 
policy. The normative desirability of federalism depends on who is in power in 
the federal government. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should overrule its broad interpretation of Congress’s 
power under the Property Clause. A deep dive into constitutional history shows 
that, when the nation first grappled with the issue in the early nineteenth centu-
ry, the leading statesmen of the day all rejected an expansive interpretation of 
federal power over the public lands. Federal landownership was consistent with 
a republic of equal states, they argued, only because it did not displace the pri-
macy of state sovereignty over most issues. When the Supreme Court’s early 
precedent—including the infamous Dred Scott decision—are read in context, 
they reveal that the Court shared this understanding of the Property Clause. 
Although federal land ownership is fully consistent with constitutional history, 
the modern doctrine otherwise has no historical support prior to the New Deal 
era. 
The Court’s interpretation of the Property Clause is also inconsistent with 
modern constitutional law. Over the past several decades, the Court has limited 
federal power, most notably under the Commerce Clause, to preserve a sphere 
of autonomy for the states. A broad interpretation of the Property Clause, how-
ever, could easily allow Congress to bypass such limitations and undermine 
state policy. The Court’s Property Clause doctrine is especially inconsistent 
with the Court’s recent recognition of the equal state sovereignty principle, 
which first emerged during the debates over the public lands. 
Advocates of environmental regulation should not reject this Article’s ap-
proach to Congress’s Property Power out of hand. Congress could continue to 
regulate activities on federal land as a landowner. This Article’s interpretation 
of the Property Clause would simply empower the states to act as an additional 
check. Because the states cannot interfere with federal title, they could not seize 
federal land and authorize new land uses over federal objections. The Article’s 
approach would thus structurally favor conservation over development. On oth-
er matters, the normative desirability of empowering the states would depend 
on who is in office. 
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